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broad outlines for functional reasons.  This Article offers a transaction cost
explanation for the practical similarity and the differing styles of delineating
property and ownership in the two systems.  As opposed to the “complete” prop-
erty system that could obtain in the world of zero transaction costs, actual prop-
erty systems employ structures characterized by shortcuts in order to achieve
property’s substantive goals of protecting interests in use.  Overlooking this
structure leads to the bundle of rights picture of property, even though property
is a structured bundle of relationships.  The architecture of property consists in
part of four basic relationships, and a number of characteristic features of prop-
erty automatically arise out of this architecture, including exclusion rights, in
rem status, and running to successors.  Where civil law and common law differ
is in their style of delineation, which reflects the path dependence and network
effects from a common mode of legal communication and initial investment in
feudal fragmentation in the common law and Roman-inspired holistic domin-
ion in civil law.  This transaction cost explanation for the functional similari-
ties but different delineation process in the two systems promises to put the
comparative law of property on a sounder descriptive footing.
INTRODUCTION
Fragmentation is a theme in property theory, but the theory of
property itself is deeply fragmented.  At first blush, a major fault line
in property lies between common and civil law.  As is well known, civil
law systems tracing back to Roman law place heavy emphasis on own-
ership (dominion) and are highly grudging in giving in rem effect to
lesser interests like leaseholds.  By contrast, the common law empha-
sizes the estate system and its many methods of carving up property,
from life estates to defeasible fees and various future interests.  And in
the common law tradition in a broader sense, the equity courts devel-
oped the trust, which is largely unknown in traditional civil law.
Sometimes this conventional wisdom about the gulf between common
and civil law of property goes so far as to claim that there is no such
thing as ownership in the common law.1  Feudalism lives!
1 See, e.g., J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 69 (1996) (“Since what is conveyed
is always an estate in the land, it has been widely assumed that ‘ownership’ of land, as
such, is not a conception internal to English land law.”); see also 2 WILLIAM BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES *105 (“This allodial property no subject in England has; it
being a received, and now undeniable, principle in the law, that all the lands in
England are holden mediately or immediately of the king.  The king therefore only
hath absolutum et directum dominium; but all subjects’ lands are in the nature of a
foedum or fee . . . .” (internal citations omitted)).
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This stark cleavage between common and civil law has taken on a
new life with the so-called “legal origins” literature,2 which has influ-
enced the World Bank’s pronouncements on development.3  Suppos-
edly, having a common law rather than a civil law system correlates
with economic growth.  Different versions of the literature posit differ-
ent causal mechanisms as lying behind the correlations (to the extent
that they have persisted in the face of continued testing and method-
ological questioning).4  Despite the favorable attention for their tradi-
tion, common law legal theorists have been quite unreceptive to this
branch of economic literature, partly because they doubt that the
kinds of doctrines that distinguish civil from common law could possi-
bly have real world effects, much less effects on the scale that the legal
origins literature purports to find.5
How, if at all, is the distinction between civil and common law
property important?  Life goes on in the two systems in strikingly simi-
lar fashion.  Putting aside for the moment special features like the
trust, ownership under the civil law and fee simple ownership of land
in the common law system (and for the most part the respective
notions of full ownership of personal property) coincide to a remarka-
ble extent in their basic features: a possessory right to prevent inva-
sions subject to qualifications such as for necessity, and supplemented
2 See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et. al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 285, 285–87, 291–98 (2008); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and
Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1113, 1116 (1998); see also Paul G. Mahoney, The
Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2001)
(finding higher growth in countries of common law origin and attributing effect to
judicial independence).
3 Most notably, legal origins and normative conclusions based on them have fea-
tured prominently in the World Bank’s Doing Business reports. See, e.g., WORLD BANK,
DOING BUSINESS IN 2004, at xiv (2004), available at http://rru.worldbank.org/Docu-
ments/DoingBusiness/2004/DB2004-full-report.pdf (relying on legal origins litera-
ture).  For critiques, see, for example, Benito Arruñada, Pitfalls to Avoid when
Measuring Institutions: Is Doing Business Damaging Business?, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 729
(2007).
4 See, e.g., Daniel Klerman et al., Legal Origin or Colonial History?, 3 J. LEGAL ANAL-
YSIS 380, 380–83 (2011); Ralf Michaels, Comparative Law by Numbers? Legal Origins The-
sis, Doing Business Reports, and the Silence of Traditional Comparative Law, 57 AM. J.
COMP. L. 765, 774 (2009); Holger Spamann, Large-Sample, Quantitative Research Designs
for Comparative Law?, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 797, 805 (2009).
5 See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Legal Origin and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L. REV.
460 (2006) (arguing for the greater importance of politics than legal origins as a
cause of economic performance); see also Curtis J. Milhaupt, Beyond Legal Origin:
Rethinking Law’s Relationship to the Economy—Implications for Policy, 57 AM. J. COMP. L.
831 (2009) (outlining an analytical framework that emphasizes the relationship
between law and markets).  The importance of the rule of law is a related but distinct
question. See, e.g., KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS 31–32 (2006).
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by duties (for example, for lateral support or to shovel sidewalks).
Lesser interests, like leases and easements, despite some differences,
bear a close resemblance in the two systems.  So is the supposed differ-
ence between the two systems non-existent at the functional level, put-
ting labels like “dominion” and “estate” aside?
Upon closer inspection, the fault lines between common law and
civil law are more subtle than conventionally thought, although in a
sense they are more important and interesting.  This Article will iden-
tify these more subtle fault lines and offer a transaction cost explana-
tion for them.
One reason the fault lines between common and civil law are
both less and more apparent than they should be stems from a failure
to make some basic distinctions.  First, property’s purpose of protect-
ing interests in use differs from the structure it employs to achieve this
purpose.  Property serves our interests in using things—this is the rea-
son we have property.  Other desirable features of property—its pro-
motion of stability, autonomy, investment incentives, fairness, and
efficiency—all trace back to this basic interest in the use of things.6
But property law serves these substantive purposes and the overarch-
ing interest in use in an indirect fashion, through a particular struc-
ture.  To see this, consider the zero transaction cost world of Coase’s
thought experiment.7  In that world, we could serve each individual’s
interest in use vis-à-vis every other individual’s potential use interest by
specifying the rights and duties (privileges and so forth) that hold
pair-wise between all the members of society with respect to the most
articulated uses of the smallest fragments of things.  This is intractable
in our world.  So instead, property uses shortcuts and strategies—what
we call “structure” here—to achieve an approximation.8  In an exclu-
sion strategy, property law delineates lumpy things and defines rights
to them using crude proxies of boundary invasion and touching: this
roughly corresponds to trespass and conversion (keep off or don’t
touch without permission).  For certain important conflicts the law
uses governance strategies to mediate them—think devices such as
nuisance or covenants designed to prevent odors or excessive building
height.  The point is that, in our world, the structure based on exclu-
sion and governance is not as transparent to the use interests of prop-
6 See, e.g., J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 68–74 (1997); Henry E.
Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE
L.J. 1742, 1751 (2007).
7 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960).
8 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More Coasean,
54 J.L. & ECON. S77, S77 (2011); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two
Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S453 (2002).
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erty as it could be if transaction costs—and delineation costs in
particular—were lower.
Both property’s use interests and structure can be distinguished
from what we will call the style of property delineation.  The same use
interests, and even the same structures, can be implemented in a
number of ways.  To take a familiar example, we can achieve roughly
the same result by carving out an easement as a right to use from full
ownership on the one hand or endowing contracts (covenants) with
the ability to bind successors and third parties on the other.  The
result is the same—a use right in the owner of the dominant tene-
ment and a corresponding duty in the owner of the servient tene-
ment—but the route there is different.
A similar contrast of top-down versus bottom-up routes can be
seen on a far grander scale in civil versus common law property, when
they employ different styles of delineating property.  As a first approxi-
mation, civil law starts with a strong notion of full ownership—domin-
ion—and then grudgingly carves lesser interests out of it (iura in re
aliena).  By contrast, the common law defines estates from the bottom
up: they are carved out of larger estates, but their definition in terms
of length and various features is not seen as tightly bound up with full
ownership.  Technically, under the full feudal interpretation of the
common law, only the monarch has full ownership.  Title too is rela-
tive, such that A can have better title than B and C, and B can have
better title than C.  The basic contents of these carved out interests
are roughly similar in common and civil law when it comes to the
types of discretion over uses that it gives the holder of the interest.
And property law in the two systems affords similar contours of protec-
tion in terms of possessory actions and trespass.  But the method of
getting there—the style—is different.
At this point one might ask whether style is trivial.9  We say no, for
several reasons.  First, from the internal point of view, what we are
calling style closely corresponds to the theory behind the two systems,
and is very real to participants.  Thus, style has a certain reality from
an internalist perspective.  The internal perspective is not one to
which law and economics has paid much attention, but our second
goal is to show that style is amenable to economic analysis.  Third and
finally, style does matter at least around the edges, and our economic
9 Cf. Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis,
84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 544 (1990) (“I . . . develop the ‘triviality hypothesis’ that, appear-
ances notwithstanding, state corporate law is trivial: it does not prevent companies—
managers and investors together—from establishing any set of governance rules they
want.  After a century of erosion through competition for corporate charters, what is
left of state corporate law is an empty shell that has form but no content.”).
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analysis can explain how style matters.  In certain pockets of property
law, even a slight push from style can make a difference, particularly
in areas on the borderline between property and contract such as
landlord-tenant.  Moreover, style interacts with use interests and struc-
ture in predictable ways.
Returning to civil versus common law property, we take as our
starting point the growing attention to how civil and common law are
more congruent in their major structures for functional reasons than
traditional theory would have it.10  We argue that civil and common
law property systems have been perceived to be separated by an
unbridgeable gap, because the two traditions have each failed to dis-
tinguish sufficiently between property’s structure and its style.  As long
as property responds to functional needs and those needs are some-
what similar across modern societies, various systems of property law
will bear a strong resemblance to each other.11  The basic indirect
relationship between interests in use and the legal interests (as with
the life estate and the superficies) is an inevitable feature of the over-
whelming transaction costs of the “complete” property system envi-
sioned on many versions of the bundle of rights theory.  In short,
10 See, e.g., KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE
LAW 34 (Tony Weir trans., 3d rev. ed. 1998).
11 We leave open the question whether the common law style of delineation is a
consequence or only contingently related to a greater role for judges in the common
law or a greater degree of judicial independence.  The range of opinions could hardly
be wider. Compare 5 J. BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 235 (Russel and
Russel, 1962) (reproduction of 1843 original) (“Do you know how they make [the
common law]?  Just as a man makes laws for his dog.  When your dog does anything
you want to break him of, you wait until he does it and then beat him.  This is the way
you make law for your dog, and this is the way judges make laws for you and me.”),
with Benito Arruñada & Veneta Andonova, Common Law and Civil Law as Pro-Market
Adaptations, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 81 (2008) (arguing that common and civil law
are both pro-market adaptations, with nineteenth-century civil-law codes as a mecha-
nism to restrain anti-market judges), and Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Predictability
and Legal Evolution, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 475 (1997) (arguing that common law is
more adaptive because of judges’ greater role), and Mahoney, supra note 2 (present- R
ing result as supporting argument that common law is superior to civil law because of
judicial independence).  One reason to defer this issue is that even in common law
countries, courts have refrained from innovating in the most basic aspects of prop-
erty. See infra notes 54–56, 66, and accompanying text.  Also, it is an open question R
exactly how much courts’ decision making really does differ in the two systems, both
because case law and precedent play an often underappreciated role in civil law sys-
tems and codification (in the area of property in particular) plays an important and
growing role in common law countries. See generally Nuno Garoupa & Carlos Gómez
Ligüerre, The Syndrome of the Efficiency of the Common Law, 29 B.U. INT’L L.J. 287,
321–34 (2011) (discussing courts in civil and common law countries as part of argu-
ment that civil law has not been shown to be less efficient than common law).
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because of transaction costs, the basic contours of the use interests
and structure in civil and common property laws are similar.12
The perceived differences between civil and common property
laws lie in their different styles of delineating property rights.  Civil law
starts with ownership, the legal interest that corresponds to the fullest
use interest we can have in dealing with things—the greatest degree of
control one can have—and then evaluates each lesser interest and the
various devices for protecting them, in terms of how it does or does
not promote this full type of interest.  By contrast, the common law
system grew out of feudalism and has always focused on the various
lesser estates, which people might employ to protect various specific
smaller classes of uses.  Pushed to the limit, the common law then
projects this fragmented picture back on the question of use itself and
sees only a welter of specific uses and ignores the importance of the
full reservoir protected by a simple exclusionary strategy.  The “bun-
dle of rights” is in a sense the theory implicit in the common law sys-
tem taken to its extreme, with its inherently analytical tendency, in
contrast to the dogged holism of the civil law.  In transaction cost
terms, both the civil and common law systems need an indirect rela-
tion between use interests and the legal interests and associated
devices that serve them, but for historical reasons, civil law overem-
phasizes the overall interests in use, whereas the common law overly
stresses the particular legal interests.  Civil law is preoccupied with
assimilating the pieces (interests) to the whole, whereas common law
tries to articulate more specific uses corresponding to lesser interests
and the devices that serve them.  If the distinction between use inter-
ests on the one hand and legal interests on the other is not made,
then it is easy to under-articulate the lesser interests (civil law) or over-
articulate them (common law).
Our theory points out that the styles of civil and common prop-
erty law have both persisted for transaction cost reasons.  Style, more
than use interests or structure, is subject to path dependence.  On the
cost side, the style of a system involves large fixed costs that only
organized actors (like revolutionaries or authoritarian rulers) can
accomplish in moments of political crisis.  On the benefit side,
because style itself matters only around the margins, it is difficult to
change at other times because there is not much pressure for doing
12 It is also worth noting that certain functionally important structural aspects of
property in land cut across the civil versus common law divide.  Importantly, registra-
tion of title can be found in Germany (civil law) and Australia (common law), and
recordation features in France (civil law) and the United States (common law). See
BENITO ARRUÑADA, INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF IMPERSONAL EXCHANGE 43–75
(2012).
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so, unlike with the contents of particular legal interests or structure.
Further, the style of property delineation is subject to strong network
effects as reflected in the internalist perspective just mentioned.  A
style is more useful the more people are using it, and so should show
scale effects on the demand side, i.e., network effects.13  The style of
delineation is an aspect of communicating entitlements, and sharing a
style makes that communication easier.  Particularly in property,
where not only officials and transactors but in many situations poten-
tial tortfeasors and non-official third party enforcers all need to pro-
cess information about entitlements, a shared format and method of
presentation of legally relevant information about property is particu-
larly beneficial.
Because of their different histories, civil and common law face
different costs of delineating property rights.  In civil law, the starting
point for the creators of the modern codes is the Roman-inspired
undivided dominion and further division is a costly departure.  These
costs include the information costs of keeping track of the divisions
and the need for third parties to process in rem rights.14  When
Roman law came to be elaborated in the process of creating the mod-
ern codes, the implicit limitation on the proliferation of new types of
lesser property rights took the form of strong standardization of prop-
erty rights into a limited list (numerus clausus).  By contrast, the com-
mon law of property originated in feudalism, in which the focus was
on personal relationships and reciprocal services.  Thus, the fixed
costs of a highly fragmented system were incurred long ago under cir-
cumstances in which they were worth incurring for political reasons.
The result has been the persistence in the common law of a more
articulated system than strictly necessary, especially given that a small
number of combinable forms can achieve most parties’ objectives.
Accordingly, part of this path dependence takes the form of a looser
version of the numerus clausus in common law than in civil law
countries.15
Part I will argue that property’s structure is distinct from the use
interests that it serves.  Property employs strategies of delineation
13 See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Inno-
vation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70, 70–71 (1985); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network
Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 426–27 (1985).
14 See generally Henry E. Smith, Standardization in Property Law, in RESEARCH HAND-
BOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 148 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith
eds., 2011) (discussing the numerus clausus principle); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle,
110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000) (same).
15 Merrill & Smith, supra note 14, at 8–12, 20–24. R
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(exclusion and governance) to serve people’s interests in use.  Com-
mon law and civil law property are similar in their broad outlines,
most probably for functional reasons.  We will concentrate on explain-
ing the origins and persistence of different “styles” of delineating
property in the two types of systems, and we draw out some implica-
tions for property versus contract, especially in mixed systems of civil
and common law.  As predicted, style in property law is much more
resistant to change than in contract law, and more in rem aspects of
property are more stable in terms of style than more in personam
aspects of property law. Part II will set out an alternative to the con-
ventional bundle of rights picture of property: property as a struc-
tured bundle of legal relations.  The four prototypical property
relations we identify follow from the exclusion-governance structure
of property.  In addition, because this exclusion-governance structure
explicitly (as in civil law) or implicitly (as in the common law) employs
“things” as part of the basic set-up of delineating property,16 three
“features of property” follow more or less automatically form the pro-
cess of delineation.  These three features are the right to exclude, in
rem status, and running with assets.  In Part III, we show that common
law property tends to emphasize estates and other mechanisms to
serve fine-grained uses, at the expense of attention to the holistic
nature of full ownership.  We then offer a transaction cost explanation
based on the high fixed costs of setting up the estate system, large
network effects, and high switching costs—all of which lead to path
dependence.  In Part IV, we turn to civil law and demonstrate that its
preoccupation with dominion and things causes difficulties in margi-
nal areas of propertized contracts, like leases.  Civil law too exhibits
strong path dependence for similar reasons to the common law, but
with the costs incurred in Roman times and at the creation of the
modern codes, when it was possible to incur high fixed costs.  Despite
marginal inconveniences, strong network effects and high switching
costs combined with the low functional costs of maintaining the civil
law style lead to path dependence in the civil law world as well.  Part V
concludes with some thoughts on how economic theory can serve to
put comparative work about property on a sounder footing.
I. STRUCTURE AND STYLE IN PROPERTY
Property ultimately serves our interests in use.  To do so in a
world of positive transaction costs, property law employs an exclusion-
governance structure that forms important shortcuts over the fully
16 See Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1691
(2012).
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articulated set of uses and potential use conflicts holding between
pairs of members of society.  Conflating property’s use interests and
structure is quite common in property theory and nowhere more so
than in the bundle of rights picture of property, which is the conven-
tional wisdom in the United States and to a lesser extent in the com-
mon law world.
A. Structure: The Indirect Relation between Use Interests
and Legal Interests
What are our interests that the law of property serves?  We adopt
the view that people’s primary interest in things is to use them, in the
broadest sense.  The notion of use includes non-consumptive uses like
preservation, aesthetic and existence value, and non-possessory con-
tingent use (as in the security provided by mortgages and liens).  By
contrast, people have no socially recognized interest per se in exclud-
ing others from things, and someone who excludes for its own sake—
without any reason other than to see someone else excluded—may be
able to do so but would be considered somewhat odd.  How is it then
that, for many people, some version of the right to exclude is the cen-
terpiece of property?17
Here we need to turn to the indirect relation between use inter-
ests and the legal interests (and their contours) that property employs
to serve people’s interests in use.  Again, take the law of trespass,
which instantiates in a fairly pure form the exclusion strategy for pro-
tecting use interests: by being able to exclude others who do not have
permission, the possessor (and by extension owners) can go about
using property for many different purposes they might have, as noted
earlier.  In the absence of further refinement through covenants, zon-
ing, and the like, the owner enjoys a “reservoir” of uses that are pro-
tected by the law of trespass.  All sorts of meddlers and thieves can be
prevented from interfering with the uses because their access can be
denied.  The owner is not obligated to exercise exclusion rights, and
the owner is free to offer conditional access, which conduces to all
sorts of projects involving uses best undertaken in a joint manner.
The key here is that some strategies for protecting uses are highly
indirect, because the proxies they employ (for example, the crossing
of the boundary of a parcel) are only roughly correlated with harm to
17 See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 1, at 30–32 (analyzing property as an “open-ended R
set of use-privileges” protected by “trespassory rules”); PENNER, supra note 6, at 68–74; R
Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 277 &
nn.6–8 (2008); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV.
730, 739 (1998).
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the owner’s interests.18  The law of trespass studiously avoids making
reference to particular uses, and does not even require a showing of
harm to any use whatever.  Moreover, the law of trespass (like the law
of ejectment, replevin, and the like) does not require the owner to
justify the owner’s uses, or even to show that they are more valuable
than the uses that the defendant would like to undertake.  One simple
strategy based on a message of “keep off” or “don’t touch” protects a
large and indefinite class of interests in use in a wide variety of
resources.
The indirectness between use-interests and the legal interests that
serve them arises for transaction cost reasons, and will, we argue, be
the key for unlocking the difference between the common and civil
law traditions in property.  Why are legal interests more coarse-
grained than use interests?  And why are the devices employed to pro-
tect legal interests (such as trespass) only indirectly related to the use-
interests they protect, or put differently, why aren’t property doctrines
more tailored to the interests they serve?
In the broadest sense, the indirectness of property stems from
positive transaction costs.  In a zero transaction cost world, the Coase
Theorem shows that we could use any devices with any degree of tai-
loring to protect use interests, and if such devices were not optimal for
those concerned—however many they are—they would transact
costlessly toward the efficient result.19  Or, if we think of transaction
costs as the costs of institutions,20 the most articulated bundle of rights
imaginable—every right with respect to every conceivable fine-grained
use as between every pair of people with respect to every contin-
gency—could be effected without cost.21  In the real world, legal inter-
ests clump together use interests, and the devices like trespass
employed to protect the legal interests can be blunt and simple in
18 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation between Ends and
Means in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 963 (2009) (“Exclusion rights
serve interests in use only indirectly, but . . . [c]onstant reference to these interests
would undermine property’s advantages of solving problems wholesale and coordinat-
ing the activities of often non-anonymous actors.”).
19 Coase, supra note 7, at 15. R
20 See Douglas W. Allen, What Are Transaction Costs?, 14 RES. L. & ECON. 1, 3
(1991) (arguing that transaction costs are better defined as the costs of establishing
property rights, in the economist’s sense of a de facto ability to derive utility from an
action, rather than narrowly as the costs of exchange); see also RICHARD O. ZERBE, JR.,
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 168 (2001) (adopting Allen’s defini-
tion); Steven N.S. Cheung, The Transaction Costs Paradigm, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 514, 515
(1998) (defining transaction costs as costs that do not exist in a Robinson Crusoe
economy).
21 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 8, at S79. R
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order to avoid transaction costs.  Use interests can as a result be left
largely implicit; they need not be spelled out (as they would in a world
of only separately defined use rights).  Legal interests and the strate-
gies property law employs to protect them are a shortcut over the
hypothetical “complete” system of property rights that could be
achieved in a zero transaction cost world.22  In our world, we need to
make do with a property system that uses a basic exclusion strategy
and reserves more fine-grained regulation of uses to more direct
devices such as covenants, nuisance, zoning, and custom in a variety of
governance strategies.23
B. Style and the Path Dependence of Property
The structure of property systems tends to show common con-
tours for functional reasons, but transaction costs of a different sort
explain why civil and common law differ greatly in terms of their style
of delineating property rights.  Our basic explanation of the persis-
tence of the respective styles rests on path dependence.24
What is a style of property?  In general, a style is a manner of
doing things that is characteristic of a particular culture.  Often the
same function can be served by artifacts exhibiting different styles
(think of the design of pots or the shape of automobiles).  Common
and civil law can be thought of as families of legal cultures,25 in which
a function, here delineating property rights and setting up interlock-
ing property doctrines, can be served in multiple ways.  We will focus
on the process of delineating property rights.  Later we will return to
22 An analogy can be drawn to incomplete contracts, with property operating on
a larger and more impersonal scale. See, e.g., Oliver Hart & Bengt Holmstrom, The
Theory of Contracts, in ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC THEORY 71, 71–155 (Truman F. Bewley
ed., 1987) (arguing that incomplete contracts are necessary because transaction costs
prevent parties from making their agreements completely contingent).
23 Smith, supra note 8, at S456. R
24 See, e.g., DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECO-
NOMIC PERFORMANCE 93–94 (1990); S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Depen-
dence, Lock-in, and History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205 (1995) (discussing the three
different forms of path dependence); see also Paul A. David, Path Dependence, Its Critics
and the Quest for “Historical Economics,” in EVOLUTION AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN ECO-
NOMIC IDEAS 15 (Pierre Garrouste & Stavros Ioannides eds., 2001) (making a case for
the economic significance of path dependence); W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technolo-
gies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events, 99 ECON. J. 116, 117 (1989).
25 Anthony Ogus, The Economic Basis of Legal Culture: Networks and Monopolization,
22 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 419 (2002); see also Nuno Garoupa & Thomas S. Ulen, The
Market for Legal Innovation: Law and Economics in Europe and the United States, 59 ALA. L.
REV. 1555, 1615–16 (2008) (discussing monopolizing tendency of legal culture in
Ogus’s sense).
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the details of how common and civil law styles of delineating property
differ, but we outline here what is at stake.
One basic choice in delineating property rights is how explicitly
thing-based delineation should be.  In functional (structural) terms,
property systems can differ as to whether they rely on thing-based
exclusion from parcels in the case of land or more on overlapping
governance rights (as in many indigenous property systems).  But
even in property systems that give wide discretion to owners over
defined things, the thing can be an explicit starting point as it is in
civil law, especially German law (in which the thing must be tangible).
In a sense, the delineation of estates in the common law focuses more
on persons and activities, with thing ownership left implicit.26
Corresponding to the differential focus on things, systems of
property law differ in their approach to ownership and title.  For the
civil law, as we will see, it is always important as a matter of theory to
identify, as far as possible, the owner of a thing.  By contrast, common
law notions of ownership are looser and sometimes extend to the
holder of any interest.27  The common law pushes the notion of rela-
tivity of title much further, under which B can have better title than C
even though A has better title than both.28  For many purposes some-
one like B is treated as a lesser owner, and by the same token A’s
status as true owner is put on the same plane as the relation of B and
C, etc.  Perhaps the most famous example of the common law
allowing relationships to trump the unity of ownership is the trust, in
which a settlor transfers legal title to a trustee, who is obligated to
manage it for the beneficiary.  Controversy has flared up from time to
time over whether the trust is contract or property (or both), but the
main point is that the common law tolerates this type of fragmenta-
tion in the gray area between property and contract.29
26 Or, as Antonio Gambaro puts it, “ontological” approaches to property are
favored in Europe, but the “relationship” approach has prevailed in the U.S.  Antonio
Gambaro, Property Rights in Comparative Perspective: Why Property Is So Ancient and Dura-
ble, 26 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 205, 214 (2011).
27 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 10 (1936) (defining “owner” as “the person
who has one or more interests”).
28 Sukhninder Panesar, The Importance of Possession of Land, 33 HONG KONG L.J.
569, 572 (2003) (“The idea of relativity of title and ownership holds that there is no
such thing as absolute title to land and as such, a claim to land, and for that matter
other property such as chattels, depends on the non-existence of a better claim to the
same thing.”).
29 The recent disagreement—compare John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis
of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 627, 669 (1995) (acknowledging that “[t]rust is a
hybrid of contract and property,” but maintaining that at bottom “[t]rusts are con-
tracts”), with Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Compara-
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As a result of these differences in delineation, property can look
more or less distinct from contract.  In the civil law system, and the
German version in particular, there is a strict separation of property
from obligation (including contract).  By contrast in the common law,
many of the lesser estates look something like very long term rela-
tional contracts (which under feudalism they were in a sense).  Sub-
stantively, we can reach a particular result, like an easement or a lease,
by taking thing ownership and separating out some sticks for the ease-
ment holder or the lessee.  Or we could start with a contract over cer-
tain kinds of uses of a thing and give them more property protection
against third parties (and in the case of leases, possessory protection)
and the ability to bind successors of the holder of the dominant tene-
ment or reversion.
Our account of civil and common law takes as a starting point the
observation that, in a sense, the difference between civil and common
law is like these two paths to a servitude, writ large.  As is well known,
the common law defines ownership as a robust and enduring form of
possession (possession plus), whereas civil law defines ownership
directly in terms of “full rights” to things, in terms of which lesser
interests of a possessory sort can be defined.30  In the common law,
ownership historically grew out of the robust protection of possession-
like seisin, and even today, possession gives a presumption of owner-
ship.31  The emphasis on possession, which is in the first instance a de
tive Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 434 (1998) (showing that trust
cannot be replicated by contract)—echoes the famous Maitland-Scott debate. Com-
pare FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, EQUITY: A COURSE OF LECTURES 110–11 (John Brunyate
ed., 2d ed. 1936) (arguing that trusts are fundamentally contracts enforced in equity),
with Austin Wakeman Scott, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust, 17 COLUM.
L. REV. 269, 269 (1917) (arguing that trusts are quite different from contracts).  For
economic arguments about how trusts are and are not like property, see M.W. LAU,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TRUSTS 103–83 (2011); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 843–49 (2001).
30 We do not enter here into the raging debate in English legal history as to the
extent of the influence of Roman law and the ius commune on the common law. Com-
pare 2 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERICK WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 33–62 (2d ed. 1968) (arguing that in
English common law ius and seisina were equivalent to Roman-inspired proprietas and
possessio), with S.F.C. MILSOM, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM 39–40
(1976) (arguing that common law system of seisin is rooted in feudalism and not
Roman law).  Roman law influenced the ecclesiastical courts and may have crept into
the common law with heavy adaptation. See Joshua C. Tate, Ownership and Possession in
the Early Common Law, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 280 (2006) (analyzing possessory actions
in the context of advowsons).
31 Even Pollock and Maitland see seisin as central to the development of com-
mon law:
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facto relation, is sometimes said to reflect the concreteness and empir-
icism of the common law.32  What is meant by statements like this
regarding ownership/dominion and possession we will try to specify
more precisely under the heading of legal style.  The styles of civil and
common law property are to a large extent organized around these
respective starting points.
Although different styles may be employed to achieve similar
functional ends, they may not be equally costly, especially as time
passes.  We hypothesize that styles of property delineation are highly
subject to path dependence.  This is more than simply that “history
matters.”  Specifically, the type of path dependence identified by
Douglass North as important in explaining institutions and their per-
sistence is likely to play a large role in keeping styles of property
delineation in place.33  North argues that the features of technologies
identified by Brian Arthur as promoting path dependence all apply to
institutions: high start-up costs, learning effects, coordination effects,
and adaptive expectations.  Institutions involve increasing returns
over time for these reasons, which make them harder to change using
routine methods.34  Politically provided public goods like law can be
expected to show increasing returns and be subject to path depen-
dence because they are meant to be used widely (they are nonrival
and nonexcludable).35  This leads to reliance on collective production
involving large start-up costs, as well as learning effects, coordination
effects, and adaptive expectations on the part of producers and con-
sumers.  As a prime example, North offers the Northwest Ordinance
of 1787, which adopted a framework of property rights, a bill of rights,
and procedures for admission as a state.36  The Ordinance profoundly
shaped Western land development, despite the availability of very dif-
ferent frameworks at the time.  Finally, law reflects and creates a
mental construct, which is at the heart of this and other examples of
[I]n the history of our law there is no idea more cardinal than that of seisin.
Even in the law of the present day it plays a part which must be studied by
every lawyer; but in the past it was so important that the whole system of our
land law was law about seisin and its consequences.
POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 30, at 29. R
32 For an extreme articulation of this point of view, see Kevin Gray & Susan Gray,
The Idea of Property in Land, in LAND LAW: THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES 18, 18 (Susan
Bright & John Dewar eds., 1998).
33 NORTH, supra note 24, at 92–104. R
34 Id. at 94.
35 Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 251, 258 (2000).
36 NORTH, supra note 24, at 97–100. R
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institutional path dependence.37  Likewise, Marcel Kahan and
Michael Klausner explain that path dependence and standardization
in corporate contracting, a private law-making context, can be
explained in part in terms of increasing returns, based in turn on
learning and network effects.38  Finally, at a very high level, Anthony
Ogus defines “legal culture” as “a combination of language, concep-
tual structure and procedures,” and argues that the commonality of
usage in such a legal culture reduces the cost of interaction, leading to
network effects.39  Legal styles are an important aspect of legal institu-
tions and cultures, which we should expect to show path dependence
for similar reasons.
The styles of delineation show path dependence because they
require large fixed costs to set up and have large network effects.
Large fixed costs create scale effects on the supply and the demand
side.  On the supply side, a state setting up a property system can
spread its costs based on the size of the jurisdiction over which the
property system extends.40  Further, because the state is involved in
enforcing property rights, there are probably economies of scope in
the state’s taking on the role of defining property rights as well.41
Legal styles as a feature of the property system partake of these econo-
mies of scale and scope on the supply side, but we will focus on how
their path dependence arises from network effects—scale economies
on the demand side.42
Network externalities arise because a user finds a system or prod-
uct more valuable the more other users there are, the telephone sys-
tem being the classic example.  On the demand side, a property
37 Id. at 95–96.
38 Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting:
Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 348,
350–53 (1996).  On increasing returns and other aspects of substantive law, see, for
example, Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 604 (2001); Mariana Prado &
Michael J. Trebilcock, Path Dependence, Development, and the Dynamics of Institutional
Reform, 59 U. TORONTO L.J. 341, 350–51 (2009). See generally Raghu Garud & Peter
Karnóe, Path Creation as a Process of Mindful Deviation, in PATH DEPENDENCE AND CREA-
TION 1 (Raghu Garud & Peter Karnóe eds., 2001) (arguing that entrepreneurs play an
active role in the creation and development of path dependence); James Mahoney,
Path Dependence in Historical Sociology, 29 THEORY & SOC. 507, 507 (2000) (“[P]ath
dependence characterizes specifically those historical sequences in which contingent
events set into motion institutional patterns or event chains that have deterministic
properties.”).
39 Ogus, supra note 25, at 420. R
40 Merrill & Smith, supra note 14, at 51. R
41 Id.
42 See supra note 13 and accompanying citations. R
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system is more cost-effective if its features cohere, and this coherence
is the focus of much doctrinal work in law, especially in the civil law
world.  Although economists are not known for taking doctrine very
seriously on its own terms, doctrine aiming at legal coherence can be
a worthy subject of economic analysis itself.  To the extent that doc-
trine, including the legal style of delineation, does cohere, one can
form expectations that certain features go together.  To take an exam-
ple, the strict separation of property from obligation (contract, tort,
unjust enrichment) in civil law, and German law in particular, gives
rise to at least weak expectations about the form that doctrine will
take in areas like leases and easements.
The various features of a legal style thus are complements, and
people will find it advantageous to converge on one style or another.
Although rules that fit uneasily with the prevailing style can be
imported, they are harder to communicate and can cause costly mis-
understanding.  At the least, a legal style is a mode of communication,
and as with other modes of communication, demand-side scale econo-
mies are to be expected.  For one thing, in many instances, those mak-
ing property claims will want to be clear to others about the nature of
the claim, and legislators have an interest in avoiding “network confu-
sion effects” of excessively idiosyncratic property rights.43  Network
effects thus lead to standardization in property as elsewhere, and we
argue that network effects give rise to large-scale adoption of a single
style of delineation.
With network effects in place, switching costs are then high, and
the result is the persistence of the original standard, even if it is not
what one would choose ex post.  The controversies surrounding path
dependence focus on different strengths of path dependence and
how susceptible markets are to suboptimal lock-in.44  In the weakest
form of path dependence, “first-degree path dependence,” a system is
chosen, say driving on the right rather than the left, but either is
roughly as good as the other (as long as everyone sticks to the same
side).45  Initial conditions of a choice, or even who started driving
first, might tip things one way or the other and the choice will persist,
but (for the sake of argument) it is a matter of indifference.  No ineffi-
ciency is involved.  Second-degree (or semi-strong) path dependence
involves a choice that we would make differently now but cannot
43 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 14, at 45–49. R
44 See Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, in 1 ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 981, 985 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds.,
2000); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641,
642 (1996).
45 Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 44, at 985.
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because it is too costly to change.46  Given that information ex ante is
costly and change is costly ex post, there is still not much to regret.
Third-degree (or strong) path dependence involves persistence of a
choice that is regrettable and could be changed, say with cost-effective
collective action.47  The most controversial examples are the QWERTY
typewriter keyboard and the VHS video system.48  In both cases, it has
been argued that there is a superior system that lock-in has prevented
markets from converging to (Dvorak keyboards and Betamax, respec-
tively).49  The examples have been challenged, either as not involving
a superior system (QWERTY is no worse than Dvorak) or as ignoring
the cost-effectiveness and superiority of a system for ordinary users
(VHS is more cost-effective than Betamax for non-professionals).50
But even the skeptics of these examples note that path depen-
dence is more likely in the case of political choice: it is not all that
surprising that political choices resulting from one-time collective
action are hard to undo.51  Moreover, public goods provided through
politics are especially prone to increasing returns.52
Our path dependent story is political and involves “weak” lock-in.
Political actors can set up a new legal style in the course of reworking
the legal system for political reasons, such as setting up Norman feu-
dalism in the common law and creating codes as part of building a
post-feudal nation-state in the case of the civil codes.53  As with driving
on the right and using the QWERTY keyboard (on the skeptical view),
the legal style most of the time does not have major functional
impacts, but it is very important that people in a society converge on
such a style, leading to large network effects.  Moreover, the weakness
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 See id. at 987–88.
49 Id.
50 Compare STAN J. LIEBOWITZ & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS &
MICROSOFT 125 (1999) (arguing that the consumer’s preference for VHS over beta is
not a story of lock-in), and S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys,
33 J.L. & ECON. 1, 21–23 (1990) (arguing that the claims of the superiority of the
Dvorak keyboard are flawed), with Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75
AM. ECON. REV. 332 (1985) (arguing that QWERTY is inferior to Dvorak and
QWERTY’s popularity is a result of path dependence and lock-in).
51 See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 44, at 994–95. R
52 Pierson, supra note 35, at 257. R
53 Our approach is thus similar to the “Critical Junctures Framework.” RUTH BER-
INS COLLIER & DAVID COLLIER, SHAPING THE POLITICAL ARENA 27–39 (1991).  But, the
legal styles that we are concerned with are more of a by-product of activity at a critical
juncture.
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of the lock-in—in the sense that most of the time a legal style does not
lead to major inefficiencies—lessens the pressure to change.
Constituencies who might want changes in legal style face institu-
tional obstacles as well.  Because property is in rem, judges are reluc-
tant to make major changes to the property system, particularly when
it comes to the set of basic forms of property or methods of fragment-
ing property.54  In the civil law this principle is crystallized into the
numerus clausus, but a more implicit norm works similarly (although
less strongly) in the common law.55  The numerus clausus directs courts
to defer to legislatures, which are in a better position to supply the
clarity, universality, comprehensiveness, stability, prospectivity, and
implicit compensation, which major changes to the property system
require.56  Indeed, for changes to an entire style of property delinea-
tion, we find that the costs are larger than are typically incurred in
routine legislation.
Crucially, this account rests on the distinction we made earlier
between the interest in use and the devices property law employs to
serve them.  The functional aspects of property that are familiar—the
basic right to exclude, running to successors, in rem effect, and other
aspects like trespass, nuisance, necessity, and adverse possession—
implicate efficiency and are somewhat similar across the systems.57
Proving this is not our point here; rather, the fact that legal style can
operate somewhat independently of these functionally important fea-
tures promotes path dependence and lock-in of the legal style.  The
style of a property system does have functional implications at the
fringes of property (such as leases), so the path dependence is not the
weakest of the weak.  But legal style is a matter of political path depen-
dence, and in most legal systems, there is no major constituency for
change of legal style.  A combination of initial conditions with high
fixed costs, high switching costs, low switching benefits, and network
effects creates the conditions for path dependence.58
54 Cf. Merrill & Smith, supra note 14, at 59 (“The numerus clausus requires courts R
to respect the status quo with respect to the menu of available property rights.”).
55 Id. at 9–24.
56 Id. at 58–68.
57 For a functional theory that predicts that civil and common law will eventually
converge on the relative reliance on judge-made and statutory law, see Giacomo A. M.
Ponzetto & Patricio A. Fernandez, Case Law Versus Statute Law: An Evolutionary Compar-
ison, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 379 (2008).
58 See, e.g., NORTH, supra note 24, at 94 (explaining the mechanisms for why infer- R
ior technologies will beat out more advanced successive technology); David, supra
note 24, at 18–19; Kahan & Klausner, supra note 38, at 353–55.  For a skeptical view R
that claims of path dependence are “some version of ‘history matters,”’ see Stephen E.
Margolis & S.J. Liebowitz, Path Dependence, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
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C. Some Implications
We now turn to some general implications of an information cost
theory of property for the distinction between civil and common law
property.  In terms of property’s structure, we expect that functional
pressures will tend to cause the systems to converge, but that is not
our focus here.  When it comes to style, we predict differential resis-
tance to change, both between property and other areas of law and
between in rem and in personam aspects within property law.  First, if
fixed costs are non-trivial in any area of law, we might expect some
inertia.  Where property is the most different from other areas of pri-
vate law (such as contract) is on the demand side: in rem rights give
rise to greater information costs, and the network effects of imper-
sonal communication can be expected to be greater for property.
And it is indeed the case that property is more resistant to change
from outside influence than public law and even contract.  The family
of legal systems sometimes known as “mixed” or “hybrid” tends for
historical reasons to consist of systems that start out as civil law and
acquire common law influences.  In such systems one striking pattern
is that property is most resistant to change, or in one well-known
assessment, property law is the “most unassailable stronghold of civil-
ian jurisprudence.”59  Indeed, in a recent study of mixed jurisdictions,
no jurisdiction showed common law influence on property but not
contract, but four showed the reverse pattern of common law influ-
ence on contract but not property.60  (Public law was even more sub-
ject to change in a common law direction.)  No mixed jurisdiction for
which data was available showed a common law type of property law.61
And some jurisdictions featured a mixture of civil and common law
within the law of contracts, which apparently happens far less in prop-
erty law.62
Furthermore, if network effects relate to property’s in rem aspect,
we should expect that hybrid legal systems and transplants should
show a pattern in which the in rem parts of property—those which
form part of the content of in rem duties and affect the state of title—
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 17 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) and Liebowitz & Margolis,
supra note 24, at 222–23. R
59 Vincent Valentine Palmer, Introduction to the Mixed Jurisdictions, in MIXED JURIS-
DICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE THIRD LEGAL FAMILY 3, 57 (Vernon Valentine Palmer ed.,
2001).
60 Kenise Kim, Mixed Systems in Legal Origins Analysis, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 693, 714
(2010).  Guyana also showed this pattern but was not included in the study because of
a lack of GDP data. Id. at 707 n.79.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 711–12.
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should be the most resistant to innovation.  This also appears to be
the case.  While we leave this implication for further work, some anec-
dotal evidence is suggestive.  Scots law has a numerus clausus of largely
civilian types of in rem rights, but innovation, including some reflect-
ing common law origins, tends to come in where property is not at its
most in rem (as in servitudes).63  In a similar fashion, English law has
been influenced by Scots law mainly in the areas of fixtures and ease-
ments.64  In general, standardization is greater where property is in
rem rather than “intermediate” between in rem and in personam (as
in trusts, leaseholds, bailments, and security interests),65 and we can
expect for similar information cost reasons that influence from
another legal system’s style would be easier in less standardized
aspects of property law.  Indeed, the history of English law provides a
familiar example: when law and equity were separate, England was in
a sense a mixed jurisdiction.  The civilian influences that came in
through the equity courts were not supposed to alter in rem property
rights provided by the common law, and equity was limited to act in
personam.66
II. PROPERTY AS A STRUCTURED BUNDLE OF RELATIONS
It is necessary to distinguish the structure of property law from its
style, and common and civil law property systems differ more in style
than structure.  Before we can turn to style, we first offer a more
articulated alternative to understanding property’s structure.  The
nature of property rights is best captured as a structured bundle of
relations, which follows from the exclusion-governance structure.
63 See Roderick R.M. Paisley, Real Rights: Practical Problems and Dogmatic Rigidity, 8
EDINBURGH L. REV. 267, 277–81 (2005).
64 See C.G. van der Merwe, Interpretation of Common Law and Civil Law as Exper-
ienced in the South African and Scottish Law of Property, 78 TUL. L. REV. 257, 274–89
(2003).  South African Law appears to be more susceptible to influence by common
law in less than fully in rem contexts, but there appears to be some more systematic
accommodation of the systems through interpretation. Id.
65 Merrill & Smith, supra note 29, at 809–51. R
66 See 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED
IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA §§ 26–27, 30, 64 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., Fred B. Rothman
& Co. 13th ed. 1999) (1853); Howard W. Brill, The Maxims of Equity , 1993 ARK. L.
NOTES 29; Charles M. Gray, The Boundaries of the Equitable Function, 20 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 192, 202–06 (1976) (illustrating how courts of equity were prohibited from
addressing real estate disputes); Roger Young & Stephen Spitz, SUEM—Spitz’s Ultimate
Equitable Maxim: In Equity, Good Guys Should Win and Bad Guys Should Lose, 55 S.C. L.
REV. 175, 177 (2003) (listing nine traditional equitable principles used by the South
Carolina courts, including “[e]quity follows the law” and “[e]quity acts in personam,
not in rem”).
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How this structured bundle of relations is achieved leaves room for
alternative methods, which we call the style of delineation of property.
The style of delineation is subject to path dependence.  The relation
of use interests, legal interests, structure, and style will form the basis
of our transaction cost explanation for the similarities and differences
between common and civil law property.
In American property law, a property right has long been
described as a collection of legal relations between parties with
respect to things (or resources).67  This characterization is less accept-
able to property scholars in civil law countries.68  The classical, main-
stream theory in civil law countries treats a property right as a relation
between a person and an object.69  While we embrace the American
version of property theory and will criticize the civil law idea in Part
IV, we are also unsatisfied with the de-emphasis on things in common
law and with the fact that the nature or the typology of the property
relationship has not been clearly spelled out.
Property theory typically fails to distinguish the use interests in
property and the structure provided by property law.  Nowhere is this
more true than in the bundle of rights picture of property.  In the
common law world, and especially in the United States, the main-
stream view looks at property as a bundle of rights—or more meta-
phorically as a “bundle of sticks”—holding between right holders and
duty bearers with respect to a thing.70  Thus, with respect to Blackacre,
67 “The word ‘property’ is used in this Restatement to denote legal relations
between persons with respect to a thing.” RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. ch. 1, intro.
note (1936); see also JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 2 (3d ed. 2010) (“Because
ownership concerns a package of distinct entitlements, we should understand it as
comprising a bundle of rights.”); WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW
OF PROPERTY 3 (3d ed. 2000) (“[P]roperty is comprised of legal relations between
persons with respect to ‘things.’”); Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property,
108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1191 (1999); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened
to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 357–58 (2001) (“Property is a
composite of legal relations that holds between persons . . . .”).  This relation denoted
“property” is more robust than possession, which is also a relationship among persons
with respect to resources. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 17, at 733 (“[T]here is a general R
consensus that property refers to particular rights of persons or entities with respect
to scarce tangible and intangible resources; that property is distinct from and superior
to the mere possession of resources . . . .”).
68 See BRAM AKKERMANS, THE PRINCIPLE OF Numerus Clausus in EUROPEAN PROP-
ERTY LAW 13–14, 399, 409 (2008).
69 See id. at 409; EVA STEINER, FRENCH LAW 378 (2010).
70 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 26–27
(1977) (reporting that the bundle-of-rights conception of property is so pervasive that
“even the dimmest law student can be counted upon to parrot the ritual phrases on
command”); Tom Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII 69 (J. Roland
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A might have the right to exclude B, the right to use the land for
growing corn, the right to cross over C’s neighboring land, etc.  What
the bundle picture denies is that there is some essence or core of
property.71  On the bundle picture, “property” is a label that we can
affix to any collection of these various use rights with respect to a
resource.  The traditional notion that property is a right to a thing
availing against others generally—an in rem right—is considered an
inconvenient obstacle to clear thinking and to badly needed reforms
in the configurations of legal rights and duties, which will require
owners to give way increasingly often to collective decision-making.72
Even where the bundle picture holds less sway, property theorists and
lawyers tend to emphasize the process of carving out interests, using
forms tracing back to feudalism.  One way or another the common
law world emphasizes types of fragmentation.  Even Blackstone—who
is famous for describing property as that “sole and despotic dominion
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the
world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the
universe”—then immediately went on to describe in voluminous
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980).  The bundle of rights theorists took some
inspiration from the work of Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld. See Max Radin, A Restatement
of Hohfeld, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1141, 1150–52 (1938) (interpreting the Hohfeldian
scheme from a Legal Realist’s point of view); see also Arthur Linton Corbin, Taxation
of Seats on the Stock Exchange, 31 YALE L.J. 429, 429 (1922) (“Our concept of property
has shifted . . . . ‘[P]roperty’ has ceased to describe any res, or object of sense, at all,
and has become merely a bundle of legal relations—rights, powers, privileges, immu-
nities.”).  The bundle metaphor seems to have been first used in the late nineteenth
century. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY 455 n.40 (1997) (citing
JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES 43
(1888)).  The bundle picture has had a mixed reception in England. Compare A.M.
Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 112–28 (A.G. Guest ed.,
1961) (analyzing ownership in a “mature legal system” into eleven elements), with J.E.
PENNER, supra note 6, at 29–30, 71 (arguing against bundle of rights picture of R
property).
71 See, e.g., Wallace H. Hamilton & Irene Till, Property, in 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 528, 528 (Edwin R.A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., 1934) (defin-
ing “property” as “a euphonious collocation of letters which serves as a general term
for the miscellany of equities that persons hold in the commonwealth”); see also
Radin, supra note 70, at 1149–51. R
72 For critiques of the bundle theory, see, for example, Merrill & Smith, supra
note 67, at 357–58, and J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA R
L. REV. 711, 714 (1996). But see Robert C. Ellickson, Two Cheers for the Bundle-of-Sticks
Metaphor, Three Cheers for Merrill and Smith, 8 ECON J. WATCH 215, 216–17 (2011) (argu-
ing that the bundle of rights metaphor still has some merits); Richard A. Epstein,
Bundle-of-Rights Theory as a Bulwark Against Statist Conceptions of Private Property, 8 ECON
J. WATCH 223, 224 (2011) (arguing for the bundle of rights analogy and arguing that
rightly understood, the bundle of rights analogy preserves limited government).
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detail the various ways of fragmenting and qualifying property
rights.73
By contrast to the common law, the civil law theory of property is
all about in rem rights, and property—ownership in particular—is
seen as inherently undivided.  The mainstream civil law tradition gen-
erally has no place for and no interest in the bundle of rights picture
of property.74  Countries with civil law systems may favor a large
degree of government regulation, but this impulse has never
expressed itself, as it did from the 1930s onward in the United States,
in the bundle picture of property.  This divergence in receptivity to
the bundle is all the more striking because certain late nineteenth-
and early twentieth-century legal theorists in Europe did advocate
something like Realism and even a proto-version of the bundle theory,
and these European sources inspired some of the American proto-
Realists.75
73 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
74 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 67, at 358–59.  A potential counterexample is
Scandinavian Legal Realism. See, e.g., AXEL HÄGERSTRÖM, INQUIRIES INTO THE NATURE
OF LAW AND MORALS 1–6 (Karl Olivecrona ed., C.D. Broad trans., 1953) (“It is plain
that there are insuperable difficulties in determining the fact which corresponds to
that which we call a right to property.”); A. VILHELM LUNDSTEDT, LEGAL THINKING
REVISED: MY VIEWS ON LAW 103–04 (1956); KARL OLIVECRONA, LAW AS FACT 171 (2d
ed. 1971) (arguing that rights are “psychological phenomena”); ALF ROSS, ON LAW
AND JUSTICE 189–90 (1959) (assigning different definitions to in rem and in personam
both in terms of content and of privilege); Alf Ross, Tû-Tû, 70 HARV. L. REV. 812,
821–22 (1957) (describing “ownership” as meaningless, yet serving a purpose of pres-
entation).  But Scandinavian systems are sometimes classified by themselves, apart
from the French and German families, and the Scandinavian systems partake of some
of the case-specific pragmatism of the common law. See Jes Bjarup, The Philosophy of
Scandinavian Legal Realism, 18 RATIO JURIS. 1, 1–2 (2005) (describing the impact of
Hägerström); Heikki Pihlajamäki, Against Metaphysics in Law: The Historical Background
of American and Scandinavian Legal Realism Compared, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 469, 469–70
(2004) (noting the comparisons between American and Scandinavian realism);
ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 10, at 277 (“[T]he Nordic states have as yet no codes R
like the civil codes of France or Germany.”).
75 The notion that all law (including property) can only regulate relationships
between human beings and that legal relationships are the only basic legal concepts
can be traced from the Realists back to Hohfeld and further back to Bierling. See
Gambaro, supra note 26, at 220 (citing ERNST RUDOLF BIERLING, ZUR KRITIK DER JURIS- R
TISCHEN GRUNDBEGRIFFE 174, 181 (Gotha 1877)).  Indeed Roscoe Pound thought that
Hohfeld drew on Pound’s own German-inspired work and that of Salmond rather
than that of his Yale colleagues. See Roscoe Pound, Fifty Years of Jurisprudence, 50
HARV. L. REV. 557, 572 (1937); N.E.H. Hull, Vital Schools of Jurisprudence: Roscoe Pound,
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, and the Promotion of an Academic Jurisprudential Agenda,
1910–1919, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 235, 278–79 (1995), (quoting Letter from Pound to
Powell (Mar. 22, 1919), Pound Papers 78–6).  Pound is clearly referring to Ernst
Rudolf Bierling (1841–1919), author of Zur Kritik der juristischen Grundbegriffe, and not
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This differential receptivity to the bundle picture is a key to the
first fault line between common and civil law property.  Common and
civil law property focus on different aspects of an important distinc-
tion between property’s use interests, legal interests, and structure.  In
the common law system, the bundle of right theory focuses on the use
interests and the estate system directs our attention only to certain
legal interests.  By contrast, the central place of ownership and its in
rem-ness in the civil law lead theorists there to stress only the overall
legal interest and the exclusion side of the property structure.
It is worth noting that some may point to the elasticity or flexibil-
ity of ownership in civil law—when a lesser property interest is extin-
guished, the bare owner recaptures the value and becomes the full
owner again76—as evidence that ownership is quite different from fee
simple absolute in common law.  Nevertheless, in common law vocab-
ulary, the elasticity just means that the original owner always keeps the
remainder or reverter.77  Hence, the elasticity does not reflect a fun-
damental or structural difference between fee simple absolute and
ownership.  Rather, it suggests that civil law limits the owner’s aliena-
bility of property more than the common law does.
In this Section we offer an alternative to the bundle picture that
will serve as a basis for our analysis of civil versus common law prop-
erty.  In Subpart A, we argue that a property right contains a structured
bundle of relations with four prototypes.78  Our thesis can clarify the
Friedrich Wilhelm Bierling (1676–1728), as Hull asserts.  More generally, the Realists
were influenced by the Free Law School in Germany, which did not become the domi-
nant paradigm there. See Kristoffel Grechenig & Martin Gelter, The Transatlantic
Divergence in Legal Thought: American Law and Economics vs. German Doctrinalism, 31 HAS-
TINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 295, 295–97 (2008); see also James E. Herget & Stephen
Wallace, The German Free Law Movement as the Source of American Legal Realism, 73 VA. L.
REV. 399 (1987) (noting that the German “free law” movement was a major source of
Legal Realist theory in America); Anna di Robilant, One Property, Many Properties:
Common Ownership & Equality of Autonomy 30 (unpublished draft) (discussing
strain of Realist property commentary in France and Italy).
76 See UGO MATTEI, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW 78 (2000); Sjef van Erp,
Comparative Property Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1043, 1056
(Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006).
77 When the retained reversionary future interests were not alienable, one solu-
tion was to call the “eventual” possessor the owner.  Now that future interests tend to
be more freely alienable, this solution is still available but its artificiality is more
apparent.
78 While the description of property as a bundle (or aggregate) of relations is not
new, no literature seems to have pointed out the typology of property relations.  And
the literature’s use of “bundle of relations” seems to be coterminous with the “bundle
of rights.”  For such description, see, for example, SUKHNINDER PANESAR, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW 19 (2001); Heller, supra note 67, at 1193–94 (criticizing R
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nature of property rights as relations and also helps to illuminate the
difference between contractual relations and property relations.  In
Subpart B, we re-visit the necessary elements of a property right and
show how a focus on the “things” of property links them with the four
prototypical relations.
A. Four Prototypes of Property Relationship
As argued above, legal systems facing positive transaction costs of
delineating property rights tend to employ some version of the exclu-
sion-governance structure.  The exclusion strategy is the default and
backbone of the structure, setting up an indirect relation between
legal interests and use interests.  Sometimes, the governance strategy
is employed when a more direct delineation of use interests is neces-
sary.  In this Subpart, we argue that four prototypical property rela-
tions should be distinguished because each employs different
combinations of the exclusion and governance strategies.  There are
four prototypes of property relations: property right holders versus
the government, property right holders versus other property right
holders, property right holders versus some specific others, and prop-
erty right holders versus all others.
In the first prototypical property relation, holding between the
holder of an interest and the government, the government under-
writes the interest (promising protection), but the interest is held sub-
ject to the government’s police power and the power of eminent
domain.79  This relation is “exceptional” in that the eminent domain
power is not a necessary element in structuring property rights;
rather, it is a convenient tool, recognized around the world, for the
government to re-allocate titles of properties to itself.
The second prototypical property relation, holding between
property right holders and other property rights holders, can be
divided into two sub-types depending on who those others are.  In the
first sub-type, a voluntary governance strategy is used, under which the
owners or tenants of fee simple absolute voluntarily agree not to exer-
cise their exclusion rights, allowing holders of “lesser” property inter-
ests (such as an easement) to use the properties in the negotiated way.
the bundle metaphor); 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.1 n.1 (A. James Casner ed.,
1952).
79 Constraining the eminent domain power is not the only method that the state
can employ to foster stability of expectations among owners: these include procedural
due process, vested rights, stare decisis, and the rule of law generally. See THOMAS W.
MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: PROPERTY
223–58 (2010).
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In the second sub-type, one holder of a lesser property interest can
“exclude” the holder of another lesser property interest but only when
the two interests conflict (as with a mortgage and a later-created ease-
ment).  The second prototypical property relation (of both sub-types)
arises in both systems only upon creation of lesser interests out of the
largest or “full” package ownership.
The third prototypical property relation, between holders of
property rights and specified others, features involuntary governance
and limited exclusion.  Here, property interest holders cannot always
determine how their things are used if the law has prescribed the
things to be used in a certain way at a certain time by a certain party.
Not all instances of property contain this type of relation, though.
The fourth property relation, between holders of property rights
and all others generally, is of a more purely exclusionary nature.  This
relation is especially important because every holder of property inter-
ests has this relation with all human beings in the world except for
those who are in the second or third prototypical relations.  The
(automatic) existence of this relation saves transaction costs and thus
is omnipresent in some form in the property structure in a world of
positive transaction costs.
1. Property Right Holders vs. the Government
The first prototype of property relation exists between property
right holders and the government.  This relationship is more a matter
of public law than the other three relationships.  Despite the differ-
ence that in the common law traditionally everyone ultimately held of
the monarch, states in both civilian and common law jurisdictions use
similar devices, sounding in due process and the rule of law, to trade
off the flexibility needed to address changed conditions and the pre-
commitment to existing property holders required in order to pro-
mote owner autonomy, elicit investment, and so on.  Of particular sig-
nificance to the internal workings of the law of property is the role of
the government as user of eminent domain.  This relation should be
independent of other relations because the government’s eminent
domain power causes the property rights, as against the government,
to be only protected by liability rules, while property right holders’
interests are generally protected by property rules as against all others
without authorized eminent domain power.  Indeed, in setting out the
framework of liability rules, under which an entitlement can be taken
upon the payment of officially determined damages, as opposed to
property rules, under which entitlements receive robust protection
aimed at requiring an owner’s consent, Guido Calabresi and A. Doug-
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las Melamed discussed eminent domain as an example of a liability
rule.80
If the relations with the government and those with non-govern-
mental entities are mixed, as the traditional account seems to assume,
eminent domain as a liability rule is like an exception to the general
property rule protection.  We contend that it is clearer to think of the
liability rule as the general rule in property right holders’ relation
with the government insofar as the issue is eminent domain, and the
property rule as the general rule (with very few, sometimes unjusti-
fied,81 exceptions) in property right holders’ relation with others gen-
erally.  These include non-governmental parties (that is, the second,
third, and fourth type of relation), and the government outside the
context of eminent domain.
2. Property Right Holders vs. Other Property Right Holders in the
Same Asset
The second prototypical property relation is among property
right holders in the same asset.  A typical example is the relations
between estate holders, say, between A with a life estate and B with the
remainder.  The relation contains two sub-types.  The first sub-type is
the relation between the “bare owner”82 and the holders of “lesser
property interests,” such as between a mortgagor and a mortgagee.
The second sub-type is the relation among holders of lesser property
interests, such as between a mortgagor and another person who holds
an easement over the same land.
In the first sub-type of relation, a property interest holder volun-
tarily changes her relation with someone from exclusion (the fourth
type) to sharing property rights.  In other words, the voluntary govern-
ance strategy is used to adjust the property interests between two par-
ties. The extent of adjustment is limited by the numerus clausus
principle.83  Thus, a property interest holder can only enter into a
80 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Ina-
lienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1122–23 (1972); see also
Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106
YALE L.J. 2091 (1997) (noting that eminent domain is associated with ex ante proce-
dural protections).
81 See Yun-chien Chang, The Inefficiency of the Accession Doctrine: A Case for the Prop-
erty Rule (working paper, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1576426.
82 This is the “nu-propriétaire” in French law. See Laurent Aynès, Property Law, in
INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 147, 161 (George A. Bermann & Etienne Picard eds.,
2008).
83 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 14, at 69 (“[N]umerus clausus defines a fixed R
universe of property rights, and the principle is rigorously enforced.”).  For critiques
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limited number of types of property relations.84  And the rights and
obligations of the relations between property rights holders are deter-
mined by civil codes or common law doctrines.85
In the second sub-type, lesser property interests are governed by
the doctrine prior tempore potior iure, or “prior in time, prior in right.”86
In other words, the right to exclude still applies, but the right to
exclude can only be exercised when the earlier lesser property inter-
ests would otherwise be hampered by the later lesser property inter-
ests.  For example, the mortgagor (who is earlier in time) can request
the court to remove a later-created easement when the mortgaged
land parcel is auctioned, because an existing easement would
decrease the auction value.
3. Property Right Holders vs. Some Specific Others
The third type of relation is where civil codes, regulations, or
court-made doctrines adopt a governance strategy and thus the prop-
erty right holder’s right to exclude is limited.  For example, in nui-
sance law, property owners cannot always require their neighbors to
stop producing noise or odor if their neighbor’s activity level is rea-
sonable.  In boundary encroachment disputes, property owners some-
times will be required to tolerate a good-faith neighbor’s
encroachment and receive only damages.  Also, landlocked owners
can pass through their neighbors’ land to access public roads under
certain circumstances.87  The list can go on.
of both theories and discussions of the application of this principle in China and
Taiwan, see Yun-chien Chang, Is Freedom of Property Form Principle Efficient?: Interpreta-
tions of Article 757 of the Taiwan Civil Code and the Underlying Theory, 7 TECH. L. REV. 119
(2010) (in Chinese).
84 This corresponds to the Typenzwang idea in German law. See NIGEL FOSTER &
SATISH SULE, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWS 493 (4th ed. 2010).
85 This is called Typenfixierung in German law. See id. at 493–94.  In countries
where lease is a type of property and there is rent control, one can think of rent
control as an involuntary governance superimposed upon the voluntary governance.
Fixed rent can also be thought of as the unchangeable content in the numerus clausus
principle.  Nevertheless, note that rent control is not universal; thus, a theory of prop-
erty rights need not embed rent control.
86 See, e.g., W.M. Kleijn et al., Property Law, in INTRODUCTION TO DUTCH LAW 103,
109 (Jeroen M.J. Chorus et al. eds., 4th ed. 2006).
87 See Yun-chien Chang, A Comparative and Economic Analysis of Access to Land-
locked Land: A Case for a Hybrid of Property and Liability Rules 7–8 (2012) (unpub-
lished article), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1986739.
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4. Property Right Holders vs. All Others
The shadow example in the previous literature on property rela-
tionships is the relations between property right holders (say, owners)
and most people in the world.  The in rem nature of property rights
discussed in the literature refers to this type of relation.  Some com-
mentators seem to consider the fourth type of relation as the property
relation.88  A vast (and increasing) number of relations are created
automatically every time any kind of property right is created.  The
nature of these relations is simple and clear—property right holders
have a right to exclude anyone who does not have either of the other
three prototypical relations with the property right holders.  In other
words, entitlements of property right holders are generally protected
by property rules.
This fourth relation—property right holder versus others gener-
ally—is the default one, which can be displaced in various contexts by
the third relation—property right holder versus specified others.  For
this reason, we might expect the fourth “in rem” relation to show
more similarity across systems.  That is, both civil and common law
employ the exclusion-governance architecture and are similar in their
law of trespass, but various legal systems differ in when and to what
extent relations of the third type involving specified others will dis-
place the background relation to the rest of the world.  Exceptions to
trespass and the content of doctrines like nuisance can be expected to
vary more, as different jurisdictions face different situations more
toward the in personam end of the spectrum and evaluate them
differently.
B. The Sine Qua Non of Property
Some theorists have looked for a sine qua non of a property right,
although on the most extreme bundle of rights view no stick is more
privileged than any other.  The most frequent candidate for the essen-
tial feature of property is the right to exclude, and even some promi-
nent bundle theorists have given it a special prominence.89  Our
argument is that all of these views come up short.  For information
cost reasons, the right to exclude and allied features “fall out” of a
thing-based approach to property—they simply follow from the basic
set-up.
88 See Sjef van Erp, Deconstruction and Reconstruction of European Property Law: A
Research Agenda, in LEGAL ENGINEERING AND COMPARATIVE LAW 105, 117 (Eleanor
Cashin Ritaine ed., 2009).
89 See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357,
370–71 (1954).
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What is a thing?  This sounds like a metaphysical question, but we
will follow both the Romans and the common-law lawyers in invoking
philosophical notions only as they are required for practical reasons.90
In particular, we argue that property is a law of things—that we have a
law of things in the first place—for transaction cost reasons.  In what
might be termed the Coase Corollary, in a zero transaction cost world
property could take on any contours without any effect on the effi-
ciency of the resulting pattern of use.91  This includes defining its
basic scope.  A “complete” property system, in which property was
defined with “full” precision on all dimensions, would be costlessly
achievable; in such a system rights would refer to the tiniest uses over
the shortest times availing between each pair of members of society,
existing and unborn, and would incorporate every conceivable contin-
gency.92  In other words, the property system could rely completely on
the governance strategy.
In our world property rights are “incomplete” so as to save trans-
action costs.93  Note that property rights can be incomplete in at least
two senses.  Incomplete property rights in the literature refer to the
incomplete delineation of property rights.  That is, some resources,
like the high seas, are held in an open-access commons, or not
propertized, more generally.94  Our notion of incomplete property
rights here refers to the lumpy legal interests and indirect devices
employed to manage propertized resources.  The law does not (can-
not, for transaction costs reasons) stipulate every tiniest use of each
property.  Instead, the law designates an owner who has a presumptive
right to exclude others to determine the use of a defined thing.95  By
90 On the highly practical use of philosophy by the Romans in the area of specifi-
catio, a form of accession, in which schools of thoughts differed in terms of how to
conceive of the persistence of a thing over time, see J.A.C. Thomas, Form and Substance
in Roman Law, in 19 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 145, 147–60 (George W. Keeton &
Georg Schwarzenberger eds., 1966).
91 Merrill & Smith, supra note 8. R
92 By the same token, in a zero transaction cost world, we would not need prop-
erty rights at all. See Cheung, supra note 20, at 518–20; see also R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, R
THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 10, 14–15 (1988) (agreeing in principle with this
observation).
93 On the other hand, when transaction costs are high, we have to adopt the
exclusion strategy, thus making property rights incomplete.
94 See, e.g., Antonio Nicita, On Incomplete Property: A Missing Perspective in Law and
Economics?, in PROPERTY RIGHTS DYNAMICS 77, 77–90 (Donatella Porrini & Giovanni
Battista Ramello eds., 2007).
95 A presumptive right to exclude in property law is like a majoritarian default
rule in contract law.  They both serve to save transaction costs.  For default rule theory
in contract law, see, for example, Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps In Incom-
plete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 89 (1989) (discussing
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defining a thing in the exclusion strategy, people’s interests in use can
be managed at relatively low cost.  The owner will decide how to trans-
act with others to share the use.
How the thing is defined will give rise to many features of prop-
erty without any extra definition.  This is what makes property rights
special and gives them their “residual” character.  John Austin noticed
this aspect of property when he said of property that “indefiniteness is
of the very essence of the right; and implies that the right . . . cannot
be determined by exact and positive circumscription.”96  Particularly
with respect to uses, the basic way that property is set up obviates the
need to spell out uses.  The result is that an owner has control over an
indefinite reservoir of uses.97  Not having to spell out the uses in this
reservoir saves on transaction costs.  Only for particularly contested
uses does it make sense to separately delineate legal relations in terms
of such uses.  For access to a driveway or the rights and duties with
respect to odors and the like, it makes sense to incur the costs of a
governance regime to “fine tune” these salient use conflicts.
Let us consider how some features thought to be characteristic of
property follow from this basic transaction cost-saving move of defin-
ing a thing through an exclusion strategy.  They include in rem status,
the right to exclude, and running with assets.  As shall be clear from
the discussions below, these three essential features are concepts at
different levels: being in rem refers to the automatic creation of prop-
erty relations between property interest holders and all others (the
fourth prototypical relation); the right to exclude describes the nature
of the second and fourth prototypical relations (property right hold-
ers versus other property right holders in the same asset, and property
interest holders versus all others), and, to a lesser extent, the third
prototypical relation (property right holders versus some specific
others); and running with assets means that when a party to a prop-
erty relation transfers her rights to another person, the new interest
holder just steps into the shoes of the original interest holder without
the difference between default rules and immutable rules in contract law and explain-
ing how economists advocate for greater use of default rules); Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Majoritarian v. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1591 (1999) (explain-
ing how an understanding of the underlying causes for contractual incompleteness
would better inform the optimal choice of default rules).
96 2 J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 799 (Robert Campbell ed., 5th ed.
1911).
97 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 5 cmt. e, § 10 cmt. c (1936); Bernard E. Jacob,
The Law of Definite Elements: Land in Exceptional Packages, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1369, 1388
(1982) (discussing how the Restatement definition of complete ownership requires
“not only reasonably exclusive present control, but also an indefinite reservoir of
potential uses”).
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disturbing the existing property relations.98  The fact that these three
features are essential yet conceptually entwined is probably why the
prior literature has been unclear about their conceptual relationship.
These three features are embedded in the exclusion-governance
structure.
1. In Rem
Property is an in rem right.  Etymologically this means a right to a
thing, and historically there is a connection between property being a
right to a thing and its being in rem in the sense of availing against
others generally.  The concept of in rem in German law, and its prog-
eny, is very prominent,99 and it means that the right is good against
the world—usually called “the principle of absoluteness (Absolutheit-
sprinzip)” in German law.100  In both civil and common law property,
the thing mediates the relation between the owner and the duty bear-
ers, who are largely told to keep out or not to interfere, unless they
have the owner’s permission.
Communicating with a large and indefinite class of persons
whose main contribution to the value of property is not to interfere
saves on transaction costs.101  In our world of positive transaction
costs, contracting with all others to keep them off one’s property is
prohibitively costly.  Automatically creating a right to exclude all
others thus saves immensely on transaction costs.  Delineating the
right based on the thing makes the right impersonal in the sense that
contextual information about the owner and the duty bearers is gen-
erally not relevant to the nature of the right (duty).  When more spe-
cific parties are involved, the further delineation of legal relations can
use the thing as a platform for getting more specific.  Thus, the law of
nuisance prescribes proper use as between neighbors, and covenants
and contracts can deal with very specific uses.  As we will see, the civil
law places particular emphasis on the in rem rights of a full owner.
98 The first prototypical relation is not closely linked with the three essential fea-
tures, because liability-rule protection of property rights against the government is not
the nature of property rights.  In fact, property rights in a jurisdiction without emi-
nent domain power are, in a sense, purer, stronger, and more property-like.
99 See MURRAY RAFF, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY 186
(2003).
100 See FOSTER & SULE, supra note 84, at 494. R
101 Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 1105, 1153–57 (2003).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-1\NDL101.txt unknown Seq: 34  7-JAN-13 9:11
34 notre dame law review [vol. 88:1
2. Right to Exclude
As noted earlier, many, including a number of Legal Realists,
have given prominence to the right to exclude in property.  Various
commentators mean different things about the right to exclude and
exclusion.  We agree with those who argue that our interest in prop-
erty is one of use that is formally protected by a right to exclude
implemented through devices like trespass.102  Nonetheless, when one
says that the right to exclude is the essence or of special importance in
property, what does this mean?
Again, the importance of the right to exclude and its limits follow
from the transaction cost theory that sees in exclusion a shortcut over
a “complete” property system defined in terms of uses in as fine-
grained a way as possible.
The transaction cost theory suggests that the right to exclude is
not a “stick in the bundle,” despite the frequent pronouncements to
that effect by, for example, the United States Supreme Court.103
Rather the exclusion strategy sets the baseline—it is a platform or
starting point—from which we know what a thing is and from which
departures in both directions—subtractions from the owner’s rights
and additions to the package—can take place. For example, the doc-
trine of necessity and antidiscrimination law withdraw sticks from the
exclusion-based baseline of rights, and easements and rights of lateral
support add to it.
For transaction cost reasons it is important to distinguish between
interests and the devices that serve them.  If exclusion is the starting
point for defining thing-based packages of rights—property—this is
not to say that there is an interest in exclusion or that such an interest
is more important than the interests in (and policies for) saving life
and limb (necessity) or promoting racial equality (antidiscrimination
law) that are served by more specific laws.  On the contrary, exclusion
and governance are simply different, with the former supplying the
rough platform for the latter.  Common and civil law both take exclu-
sion strategies as a starting point but differ in the kind and extent of
departures in the direction of governance—and, as we will soon see,
in their styles of delineation.
102 See, e.g., PENNER, supra note 6, at 68–74; Merrill & Smith, supra note 67, at R
394–97; Smith, supra note 18, at 963–64. R
103 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (“[For a property
owner] the right to exclude others [is] one of the most essential sticks in the bundle
of rights that are commonly characterized as property.”).
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3. Running with Assets
Others have identified another candidate for the essence of prop-
erty: the ability of a right to run automatically with an asset into remote
hands.104  That B can succeed to A’s interest when A holds a fee sim-
ple, other present and future interests, an easement, etc., is unremark-
able and correlates very closely with what we might call property.
Even more telling, when a contract between neighbors runs to succes-
sors, it is placed with easements in the supercategory of servitudes and
comes close to being treated as a property right.  The theoretical dif-
ference between an easement and a running covenant is that the for-
mer but not the latter binds third parties (in rem), but in the context
of neighbors it is the parties and their successors that are important.
Thus, if A covenants with B that A will not build more than a two-story
building, and both intend for the covenant to run, and it touches and
concerns the land, it will run to successors.105
Again, the running of the covenant is not a detachable feature
and certainly not a stick in the bundle.  Rather, to the extent that the
right is embedded in the baseline package of rights associated with a
thing, then it is natural for it to run.  For this reason, appurtenant
easements, which are explicitly carved out property rights, “run” with-
out controversy.  More specifically, the baseline is (consistent with the
notion of a thing) meant not to contain contextual information about
persons, and so who holds the right and the duty is irrelevant.  From
there it is a short step to saying that successors are bound.  In general,
de-contextualizing a right is a predicate for its alienability.  The same
is true for rights that run to successors.
There is thus a tendency for property rights to run to successors
more easily than contract rights.  That is true of both common and
civil law, but, as discussed in Part IV, the systems differ in where to
draw the line, partly for “stylistic” reasons.
104 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verifica-
tion: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S373,
S374 (2002).  Here we consider running with assets as a sine qua non of property.  In
terms of following from thing definition, another candidate for basic feature would
be the residual claim. See Smith, supra note 16, at 1710; see also Thomas W. Merrill, R
The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061 (2012) (arguing that residual managerial
authority and residual accessionary rights yielded by the right to exclude are the
essential features of property).
105 See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY 1026–34 (2007).  The
Restatement (Third) of Property would replace touch and concern with a more con-
tractarian approach, subject to constraints such as reasonable alienability and public
policy. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.2 cmt. a (2000).  So far no
court has explicitly adopted this innovation.
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III. COMMON LAW PROPERTY
Although the common law shares with the civil law the basic
exclusion-governance architecture, the common law employs a style
that results in less of a focus on the “things” of property.  The com-
mon law of property is not usually thought of as a law of things, and
the bundle of rights picture has only brought things further out of the
focus for property theorists.  Much of the de-emphasis on things can
be laid at the door of the estate system.  One can say that whereas the
land law in civil law systems is one of ownership, it is one of estate in
the common law countries.106
A. Focus on the Estate System to the Exclusion of Other
Lesser Property Interests
What is an estate?  It is a piece of ownership.  Originally, in the
feudal system that William the Conqueror introduced into England
after 1066 and Henry II reformed greatly, the King himself was the
only full owner.107  Out of full ownership were carved lesser legal
interests: in return for rights to land, the tenant (“holder” of the inter-
est) would be obligated to provide service to the lord.  These services
started out as military but were gradually supplanted by monetary obli-
gations.108  A tenant could turn around and subinfeudate all the way
down to land holding peasants.  The feudal obligations were abol-
ished in 1660 with the Statute of Tenures,109 but the system of divid-
ing property rights in the United States tracks the feudal system, with
modifications.  (The 1925 land reform legislation in England largely
did away with the system of legal estates.110)  Now the system of estates
basically measures property interests by time (which includes condi-
tions and limitations that can cause an interest to end).
These days, interests are rarely carved up using the estate system
directly.  Instead, other than leases, interests less than fee simple abso-
lute or full ownership are created in trust, a device tracing back to the
activities of the courts of equity and the desire of feudal tenants to
avoid certain monetary obligations.  The conventional view of the
106 John Henry Merryman, Ownership and Estate (Variations on a Theme by Lawson),
48 TUL. L. REV. 916, 918 (1974).
107 See A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 47 (2d ed. 1986).
108 Id. at 6–24.
109 12 Car. II, c. 24 (1660).
110 C. Dent Bostick, Land Title Registration: An English Solution to an American Prob-
lem, 63 IND. L.J. 55, 78 (1987).
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trust is that it splits ownership into legal and equitable sides.111  The
trustee holds the legal title and therefore can deal with the property
and, if there are no instructions to the contrary, can alienate the trust
corpus, managing the corpus and its substitutes over time in a fashion
consistent with fiduciary duties.  The beneficiary holds equitable title,
meaning that the fiduciary duties are owed to the beneficiary and that
the beneficiary has the right to the proceeds of the corpus according
to the terms of the trust when it was set up by the settlor.  Also, if the
trustee wrongfully alienates trust assets, the beneficiary can follow
them into the hands of purchasers who had notice or did not give
value.
The flip side of the great attention to divisions by time and the
extensive use of the trust is that the common law system does not
regard as central to property a variety of other types of division.
Security interests are a type of conditional property right that tends to
be covered more in commercial law than in property courses.  Even
the status of leases as both contract and property has been cloaked in
some confusion: leases give possessory rights and are somewhat stan-
dardized as to subtypes, but they are otherwise customizable.112  And
crucially while they “run” to successor landlords, they are avoidable in
bankruptcy like contract rights.  Likewise, bailments have not received
much attention, despite being widespread, as in coat checks, parking,
and the like.  But again, bailments sit uncomfortably at the intersec-
tion of the in rem and the in personam.113
B. Transaction Cost Explanations
Our transaction cost theory of the common law has a practical
and theoretical aspect.  The common law of property is not as differ-
ent from civil law as conventional wisdom would have it.  In both sys-
tems the broad contours of the system and their basic architectural
features are dictated by the overwhelming transaction cost savings of a
property system featuring the structured relations and essential fea-
tures discussed in Part II.  Nonetheless, in terms of style, civil law and
common law take different starting points in their delineation of
legally protected interests less than full ownership.
The combination of possibly large fixed costs and the original
needs of the conquering Normans lent the common law system its
111 This view has recently been questioned by those who see equitable property as
rights against rights. See Ben Mcfarlane & Robert Stevens, The Nature of Equitable Prop-
erty, 4 J. EQUITY 1 (2010).
112 Merrill & Smith, supra note 29, at 811–20. R
113 Id.
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particular character. Originally, the goal of the system was to buy loy-
alty for the new Norman ruling class and above all for the King.114
The mechanism of time- and condition-based infeudation fit the bill
nicely.  Much delineation effort in the form of fixed costs went into
setting up the system.  (To the extent that pre-Norman law was consis-
tent in terms of style of delineation with the full feudal system, no
change was necessary.)  Once the original feudal motivation disap-
peared the question was what to do with the system.  The fixed costs of
a highly articulated system had already been incurred.  The degree of
fragmentation—or more accurately the types of fragmentation—is the
reflection of path dependence.  We can see this at work these days; it
is widely acknowledged that we do not need as many defeasible fees as
we have, but there is little constituency for reform.  We would never
set the system up with as many interests as we currently have, but iner-
tia (possibly helped along by the self-interest of lawyers) keeps it that
way.115
114 Again, we do not assume that the feudal system was produced out of whole
cloth with the Norman Conquest (or the reforms of Henry II).  The exact mechanism
might shed some light on whether common or civil law might be part of political
packages that have had consequences in the past.  In particular, it is worth asking
whether the common law approach might reflect (or facilitate) fragmentation, colla-
tion building, and constraints on rulers. See, e.g., YORAM BARZEL, A THEORY OF THE
STATE 113–37 (2002) (developing theory of state that enforces and therefore deline-
ates property rights, as resulting from members of group giving power to the state
subject to collective action mechanisms against exploitation by state actors);
RAGHURAM G. RAJAN & LUIGI  ZINGALES, SAVING CAPITALISM FROM THE CAPITALISTS
129–56 (2003) (arguing that democratic institutions are a consequence of dispersed
ownership and discussing the transformation of the English monarchy); Mark F.
Grady & Michael T. McGuire, The Nature of Constitutions, 1 J. BIOECONOMICS 227, 238
(1999) (arguing that constitutions are product of coalitions of weaker group mem-
bers to resist coercion by stronger members); Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast,
Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Sev-
enteenth-Century England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 803 (1989) (arguing that reforms in the
course of the Glorious Revolution led to a credible commitment mechanism that ena-
bled secure property rights).
115 For some proposals to simplify the system of estates and future interests, see,
for example, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 24.3 cmt. a (2011) (“Continued differentiation among these subcategories [of fee
simple estates] is no longer useful . . . . [T]his Restatement recognizes only one defea-
sible fee simple estate.”); T.P. Gallanis, The Future of Future Interests, 60 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 513 (2003). See generally Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformulating the Structure of
Estates: A Proposal for Legislative Action, 85 HARV. L. REV. 729 (1972) (proposing a struc-
ture based on the premise that the only appropriate distinctions are between certainty
and uncertainty as to the termination of possessory interests and between certainty
and uncertainty as to the ultimate possession of future interests).
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Importantly, the generative quality of the basic estate system
means that much can be accomplished with a very small set of inter-
ests, and the larger set that we have is mostly a matter of inconve-
nience.  Functionally complex structures of multiple future interests
are possible because the various methods of decomposition can feed
themselves (for instance, a life estate, followed by a remainder in life
estate, followed by a remainder in fee simple).116  Thus, as argued
above, the common law system is a (somewhat complex) common
form of legal communication with attendant network effects.
The common law system never invested more than other systems
in articulating other dimensions of division, except for the trust.  And
the trust relieved a lot of the pressure from the inadequacies of these
divisions; property rights could be divided in unconventional ways
(conditioned on various events and according to the limited discre-
tion of the trustee) without needing to involve significant in rem
effects.  (It thus also made the estate system easier to use as well.)  So
path dependence offers an explanation for why the common law is
flexible about divisions without needing an elaborate theory of iura in
re aliena (rights in the property of another) along the lines of the civil
law.
England’s different history also receives an explanation.  In
England, land records were quite inadequate, partly because of pri-
vacy concerns and an inability to mandate registration.117  In 1925, the
reform of land records meant that with not that much additional
effort, a nationwide reform of the estate system could be undertaken.
In the United States, land records go back to Colonial times, and any
reform effort would have to be a state-by-state affair, helped along by
uniform acts.  Such an effort is underway, but it is too early to tell what
headway it will make.
IV. CIVIL LAW PROPERTY
Civil law jurisdictions differ in their law of property, just as Ameri-
can property law and English property law are not clones of each
other.  Indeed, the property laws of France and Germany are concep-
tually different in many ways.118  As explained earlier, our account can
explain mixed systems (in a sense, “mixed” is a matter of degree).  In
a comparative discussion of civil law property systems, this Article for
116 Smith, supra note 14, at 164–65. R
117 See Bostick, supra note 110, at 75–76. R
118 Nevertheless, “some overriding similarities remain [in German civil code and
French civil code].” JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PEREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL
LAW TRADITION 32 (3d ed. 2007).
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obvious reasons cannot handle civil codes in every country.  In this
Part, we will use civil codes from six countries as our major targets:
Germany, France, the Netherlands, Japan, China, and Taiwan.  Ger-
many’s civil code, the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB), is probably the
most influential civil code in the world, and has been taken as a model
by many other countries like Japan, China, Taiwan, Korea, Greece,
Switzerland, and Austria.119  France’s Code Napoléon was promulgated
in 1804 and has also influenced many countries such as Spain, Portu-
gal, and Romania.120  The Netherlands passed a brand new and
highly-praised civil code, Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW), in 1992.  Japan bor-
rowed heavily from Germany,121 but invented some new ideas.
China’s domestically highly contentious Property Law came into force
in 2007.122  China inherited the German model through Taiwan’s civil
code and modified it with the legal tradition of the former U.S.S.R. to
accommodate state- or collectively-owned land.123  Taiwan’s property
law is a mixture of elements from Germany, Japan, and Switzerland, as
well as customary law from before the codification in 1930. Local vari-
ations do exist, but in terms of the style of delineating property rights,
civil codes regarding property are more similar to each other than
they are to common law property regimes. In the following, we will
demonstrate how civil law property regimes are based on ideas that
are internally inconsistent or theoretically difficult.  We will also offer
a transaction cost explanation.
A. Dependence on the Notion of the “Thing”
The dependence of civil law property on the notion of things is
immediately apparent in the title of the law.  Property law in Germany
is called “Sachenrecht,” literally translated as the law of things.124
Sachen (things) only include corporeal objects, thus excluding claims
119 See RAFF, supra note 99, at 9, 16–17; Albert H.Y. Chen, The Law of Property and R
the Evolving System of Property Rights in China, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHINESE
LEGAL SYSTEM 81, 89–93 (Guanghua Yu ed., 2011).
120 William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil Law (Codified and
Uncodified), 60 LA. L. REV. 677, 687–88 (2000).
121 See, e.g, R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE LAW 158
n.26 (D.E.L. Johnston trans., Cambridge University Press 1992) (1988).
122 For an economic analysis of China’s property law, see Yun-chien Chang, Prop-
erty Law with Chinese Characteristics: An Economic and Comparative Analysis, 1 BRIGHAM-
KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 345 (2012).
123 See Chen, supra note 119. R
124 See FOSTER & SULE, supra note 84, at 493. R
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-1\NDL101.txt unknown Seq: 41  7-JAN-13 9:11
2012] civil  vs .  common  law  property 41
corresponding to intellectual property rights.125  One can only have a
true right of ownership in a corporeal object, but not an incorporeal
object.  Property systems in the Netherlands,126 Japan,127 China, and
Taiwan128 use basically the same conceptual framework.  Nevertheless,
in French law, incorporeal objects are considered movable proper-
ties.129  (Similarly, in common law property, “things” include incorpo-
real objects.130)
Civil law property theory is structured on the ownership of corpo-
real things.  The concept of property derived thus, at the theoretical
level, fits uneasily with security-interest property rights such as mort-
gages, not to mention intellectual property rights131 and trusts,132
both of which are of increasing importance in the modern property
125 See id.  Section 90 of the BGB states: “Only corporeal objects are things as
defined by law.” BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] Aug. 18, 1896,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL.] I 1600, § 90 (Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html#BGBengl_000P90.
126 3 BURGERLIJK WETBOEK [BW] [CIVIL CODE] art. 2 (Neth.). See AKKERMANS,
supra note 68, at 258.  The Dutch Civil Code, however, includes incorporeal things R
under the “patrimonial rights (vermogensrechten),” which, along with things, form the
“assets (goederen).” See CHRISTIAN VON BAR & ULRICH DROBNIG, THE INTERACTION OF
CONTRACT LAW AND TORT AND PROPERTY LAW IN EUROPE 319 (2004).
127 See HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 164–65 (3d ed. 2009); MINPO [CIVIL CODE] art.
85 (Japan), available at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?re=02&
yo=%E6%B0%91%E6%B3%95&ft=2&ky=&page=2 (“The term ‘Things’ as used in
this Code shall mean tangible thing.”).
128 China’s Property Law and Taiwan’s Civil Code are unclear about the inclusion
of incorporeal objects.  The leading opinion in Taiwan is that although claims are not
objects of property rights, natural forces can be. See TZE-CHIEN WANG, TAIWAN’S PROP-
ERTY LAW 51 (2010) (in Chinese).  In China, most scholars, probably following Ger-
man law, contend that only corporeal objects can be owned.  See, e.g., HUI-XING LIANG
& HUA-BIN CHEN, CHINA’S PROPERTY LAW 8 (2007) (in Chinese).  Note that Article 2 of
China’s Property Law allows rights to be objects of property law.
129 See AKKERMANS, supra note 68, at 409; STEINER, supra note 69, at 382; see also R
MATTEI, supra note 76, at 75 (observing that in France and Italy a property right may
have an intangible thing as its object).
130 See JOHN SPRANKLING ET AL., GLOBAL ISSUES IN PROPERTY LAW 1 (2006) (“In the
United States, we broadly define ‘property’ as legally enforceable rights among peo-
ple that relate to ‘things.’  The particular ‘thing’ might be land, or a tangible object
. . ., or an intangible item.”); VON BAR & DROBNIG, supra note 126, at 319. R
131 In the German model, intellectual property rights are not typical property
rights, because intellectual properties are not corporeal. See JÜRGEN BAUR & ROLF
STÜRNER, SACHENRECHT 11 § 2 Rn. 2 (18th ed. 2009).  French law, however, treats
intellectual properties as movable properties.  See Aynès, supra note 82, at 151; HENRY R
DYSON, FRENCH PROPERTY AND INHERITANCE LAW 15 (2003).
132 For trust law in Germany (Treuhandeigentum), see BAUR & STÜRNER, supra note
131, at 24–26 § 3 Rn. 34; AKKERMANS, supra note 68, at 184–86; FOSTER & SULE, supra R
note 84, at 499.  For trust law in France (propriété fiduciaire), see STEINER, supra note R
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world.  Below we focus our discussions on lesser property interests, as
trust and intellectual property have not been fully embraced in com-
mon and civil law countries as typical property rights.133
Civil law countries, at least those influenced by the German
model, conceptualize property as dominion of things.134  This concep-
tualization is closely related to the choice for limiting the objects of
property law to corporeal objects and theorizing property rights as
holding between persons and things (rather than persons versus per-
sons about things).  Conceptualizing property as dominion can
explain the most prominent type of property right, ownership, regard-
ing the owner’s relationship with “all others” (the fourth proto-typical
property relation).  Nevertheless, even civil lawyers meet problems
when explaining the second prototypical property relation, especially
the relations between owners and holders of “lesser property
interests.”135
In the German model, followed by Japan, China, and Taiwan,
lesser property interests can be further divided into two groups: use
rights and security rights.136  In the French model, lesser property
interests are divided into “principal property rights” and “accessory
property rights.”137  The former corresponds to the use right in the
German model, while the latter corresponds to the security right in
the German model.  Accessory property rights (or security rights)
have posed theoretical problems for the French and German model,
which both over-emphasize ownership of things in defining property
rights.  French law (followed by Dutch law138) uses the démembrement
method to create lesser property interests. Démembrement is subtrac-
69, at 387–89; Aynès, supra note 82, at 161.  For a comparison of common law and R
civil law trusts, see van Erp, supra note 88, at 118–19. R
133 But cf. MATTEI, supra note 76, at 76 (observing that intellectual properties in all
legal systems are handled within a proprietary paradigm).
134 The German literature is fond of using “Zuordnung” (allocation) and “Herr-
schaft” (control) to describe the nature of property rights. See Yong-qin Su, Freedom of
Transaction for Goods That Can Be Registered, 2010 NANJING UNI. L. REV. 16, 18 (in Chi-
nese); MANFRED WOLF, SACHENRECHT § 1 Rn. 4 (26th ed. 2011); BAUR & STÜRNER,
supra note 131, at 307 § 24 Rn. 5. R
135 This concept has been alternatively translated as “lesser proprietary interests,”
“limited real rights,” or “secondary rights.”  In German law, das beschränkte dingliche
Recht.  For a discussion of translating this term to English, see Sjef van Erp, European
Property Law: A Methodology for the Future, in EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 227, 235 (Reiner
Schulze & Hans Schulte-Nölke eds., 2011).
136 See FOSTER & SULE, supra note 84, at 510; RAFF, supra note 99, at 188. R
137 See AKKERMANS, supra note 68, at 165. R
138 See id. at 270–71, 414.
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tion or taking away parts of the whole and complete ownership.139  In
other words, “the limited property right comprises a fragment of the
right of ownership.”140  Because modern French legal scholarship
only recognizes three elements of ownership—usus, fructus, and
abusus (that is, the right to use, enjoy, and dispose),141 not including
security rights—it is unclear whether security rights are property
rights, and there has been fierce debate about this issue.142  On the
other hand, the German model has problems of its own.  In German
law, ownership is absolute, always unitary, and not fragment-able.  The
existence of limited property rights only burdens the exercise of the
powers of ownership, but the right of ownership itself remains
whole.143  This seems to be an unnecessarily complicated theory.144
What is more problematic is that the insistence of the German model
on property as dominion of corporeal things is inconsistent with the
fact that claims, which are incorporeal and not things, can be the
object of pledge,145 a type of lesser property interest recognized in the
German Civil Code.146
In summary, the key to understanding the problems of the Ger-
man and French models is that when civil law property scholars define
property rights, they think of only ownership and equate the concept
of ownership with property.  And because they define ownership too
stringently and narrowly (in terms of dominion), they have to allow
exceptions in the family of property rights to accommodate security
rights.
The correct way to conceptualize property rights and ownership
is to treat them separately.  Property is not coterminous with fee sim-
139 See id. at 413.
140 See id. at 116.
141 See id. at 93.
142 See id. at 165–66.
143 See id. at 179, 191–99, 415–16.
144 This “external-cumulative approach” in the German model, however, makes it
easier to explain why one person can be the mortgagor and mortgagee at the same
time. See van Erp, supra note 76, at 1056.
145 WOLF, supra note 134, § 1 Rn. 12. R
146 For the same criticism, see VON BAR & DROBNIG, supra note 126, at 317.  Quite R
a number of civil law countries adopt a broader definition of things, thus including
incorporeal objects.  These countries include Portugal, Italy, Austria, Belgium, etc.
See id. at 317–18.  For discussions of claims as subject matters of property rights, see
Sjef van Erp & Bram Akkermans, Property Rights: A Comparative View, in PROPERTY LAW
AND ECONOMICS 31, 34, 45–46 (Boudewijn Bouckaert ed., 2010).  Some property
scholars in Taiwan, on the other hand, have stuck to dominion of corporeal things
and treated such pledges as merely quasi-properties. See, e.g., TSAY-CHUAN HSIEH, 1
TAIWAN’S PROPERTY LAW 13–14 (5th ed. 2010) (in Chinese).
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ple absolute or ownership.  As elaborated above, a property right is
any right regarding a resource that is embedded with an in rem right
to exclude “all others” and runs with assets, while fee simple absolute/
ownership is an accumulation of all types of broadly-defined use rights
that contain all the necessary features of a property right—or, to put it
differently under the common law mindset, fee simple absolute or
ownership can be carved into all types of use rights. In addition, there
should be no exception in the definition of property rights.  Those
rights that do not contain all the core elements of property rights are
at best quasi-property rights, to which we turn in the next section.
B. Theoretical Difficulties with “Propertized Contract”
One interesting difference between civil and common law is that
while the civil law treats both contracts and torts under the common
heading of obligation (in German, Schuld) and strictly separates obli-
gation from property,147 property, contracts, and torts are three differ-
ent legal areas in the common law.148  The German conceptual
framework that strictly separates property and obligation (especially
contract), however, has to face the existence of relations falling in
between property and obligation, such as contracts with third-party
effects, which are codified but fit uneasily into the strict dichotomy.
The focus in the German framework on the dominion of things rather
than relations, we argue, makes it difficult to accurately conceptualize
and categorize these intermediate relations.
Take the lease as an example of contracts with third-party effects.
The lease is a property relation in the common law world149 but is a
contractual relation in the civil law world.  Recognizing the hardship
imposed on lessees if they have no right against a new property owner
147 While Germany, France, the Netherlands, Japan, and Taiwan more or less sep-
arate obligation (contract and torts) and property, China may be an exception.
China stipulated its General Principles of the Civil Law in 1986, Contract Law in 1999,
Employment Contract Law in 2007, Property Law in 2007, and Tort Law in 2009.  It is
still unclear if and when China incorporates these separate codes, whether tort law
and contract law will be placed under the heading of obligation law.
148 Another interesting difference is that in civil law countries, private law scholars
usually master all three areas (property, contract, and torts)—though, because of the
strict separation between obligation and property, it is even more common for a pri-
vate law scholar to be an expert in contract and torts at the same time.  By contrast, in
common law countries, at least in the U.S., it is unusual for a law professor to teach
(not to mention to be an expert in) all three areas.
149 Note, however, that in the U.S., leasehold is also partially “contractized.”  See,
e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 431–39 (7th ed. 2010); Merrill & Smith, supra
note 29, at 811–20; Thomas J. Miceli et al., The Property-Contract Boundary: An Economic R
Analysis of Leases, 3 AM. L. ECON. REV. 165, 166–67 (2001).
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who acquires the property from the lessors, most, if not all, civil codes
adopt a rule that is called “a sale does not break a lease.”150  If certain
conditions (usually regarding notice) are met, the new owners have
no choice but to step in the shoes of the original lessors—that is, the
lease runs with the asset.  German lawyers call this Verdinglichung obli-
gatorischer Rechte, literally translated as “reification of contractual
rights,”151 which is neither a typical property nor a typical contract.152
We will instead use the term “propertized contract” or “propertized
contractual rights/relations,” to make their intermediate nature obvi-
ous.  Probably to keep the strict separation as intact as possible, Ger-
man scholars have argued that conceptually this is the only type of
intermediate relation between contract and property.153
Also, in Germany154 and Taiwan,155 tenants in common can in a
covenant allocate how each co-tenant uses and manages a specific part
150 For France, see AKKERMANS, supra note 68, at 160–61.  For Germany, see id. at R
35, 240–43.  For the Netherlands, see BW art. 7:226 (Neth.).  For Japan, see ODA,
supra note 127, at 164.  For Taiwan, see LAWS & REGULATIONS DATABASE OF THE R
REPUBLIC OF CHINA art. 425 (May 26, 2010), available at http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/
LawClass/LawContent.aspx?PCODE=B0000001.
151 See van Erp, supra note 88, at 118.  The German law of obligations embraces R
(roughly) contracts, torts, and unjust enrichment, but it is contract here that is in
issue.
152 For propertized contracts in Japanese law, see ODA, supra note 127, at 164. R
153 See, e.g., Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, Die Verdinglichung Obligatorischer Rechte, in FEST-
SCHRIFT FÜR WERNER FLUME 377–78 (Horst Heinrich Jakobs ed., 1978); accord IV
CHUNG-JAU WU, CIVIL LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE 23 (2010) (in Chinese).  Wu is a Ger-
man-trained Taiwan scholar.
154 “Where the co-owners of a plot of land have arranged the management and
use or excluded permanently or for a period of time the right to require the co-
ownership to be dissolved, or have laid down a notice period, the provision agreed on
has effect against the successor in interest of a co-owner only if it is registered in the
Land Register as an encumbrance of the share.”  BGB, Aug. 18, 1896, BGBL. I 1600,
§ 1010(1) (Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/
englisch_bgb.html#BGBengl_000P1010.
155 LAWS & REGULATIONS DATABASE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA art. 826-1 (May 26,
2010), http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawContent.aspx?PCODE=B0000001
(“(1) The covenant of the use, management, partition or partition inhibition or the
decision made between the co-owners of the real property according to the first para-
graph of Article 821, is bound to the share transferee or the person who acquires the
right in rem after its recordation.  The same rule shall apply to the management
which a court has ruled that has been recorded.  (2) The agreement and decision
upon the thing held in indivision or the order made by the court between co-owners
of personal property shall also bind the share transferee and the person who acquires
the right in rem, but only when such person knows or should have known of such case
while transferring or acquiring.  (3) When the share of the thing held in indivision is
transferred, the transferee is jointly and severally liable for the charges arising from
the use, management, or other matters related to the thing held in indivision.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-1\NDL101.txt unknown Seq: 46  7-JAN-13 9:11
46 notre dame law review [vol. 88:1
of the co-owned real property.156  If the covenant is registered in the
real estate registry, subsequent transferees of any co-tenant’s share will
be bound by the covenant.  That is, the covenant runs with assets.
Property scholars in Germany and Taiwan generally consider this kind
of covenant to be a type of “propertized contract.”157
Nevertheless, if property rights are understood according to our
framework above, intermediate relations will not pose theoretical or
conceptual problems and we can understand property rights and
quasi-property rights more accurately.  In Part II we pointed out the
sine qua non of property relations and several distinctions between
property relations and contractual relations.  We argue that if a rela-
tion in question meets one or two but not all three essential features
(in rem, right to exclude, and running with assets) of a property rela-
tion, it is a quasi-property relation.  Seen from this angle, the “proper-
tized contract” conventionally understood by civil lawyers actually
contains a variety of relations that are propertized to different extents.
In the lease example above, the rights run only when a lessor transfers
her title but not when a lessee transfers what the common law would
call her “leasehold.”158  In addition, the lessee is not equipped with an
in rem right to exclude because of the lease contract itself (lessees,
however, can in their capacity as possessors usually exclude trespass-
ers).  Thus, the “a sale does not break a lease” doctrine only minimally
propertizes the lease contract.  As for the covenant to use a co-owned
resource, a co-tenant already has an in rem right to exclude other co-
tenants and all others from unauthorized use or transfer; in addition,
a co-tenant can transfer some or all of her share to any third party,
making the latter a holder of a property interest.  Thus, tenancy in
common is a full-blown property relation.  The covenant between co-
tenants that runs to transferees is, therefore, an added layer to the
property relation between co-tenants.
Merrill and Smith have pointed out that in the property-contract
interface, there are two types of intermediate relations: “quasi-mul-
tital” (relations with indefinite, nonnumerous parties) and “com-
156 For introduction and discussions of such covenants, see Hanoch Dagan &
Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549, 618–20 (2001); Yun-chien
Chang, Tenancy in “Anticommons”?  A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Co-ownership, J.
Legal Analysis, (forthcoming 2012), available at http://jla.oxfordjournals.org/con-
tent/early/2012/08/08/jla.las011.full.pdf+html.
157 See, e.g., BAUR & STÜRNER, supra note 131, at 32 § 3 Rn. 47; Yun-chien Chang, R
An Economic Analysis of the Article 826-1 of the Taiwan Civil Code: The Distinction Between
Property Rights and Quasi-Property Rights, 40 NAT’L TAIWAN U. L.J. 1255 (2011) (review-
ing the literature in Taiwan) (in Chinese).
158 See van Erp, supra note 76, at 1053.
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pound-paucital” (relations with definite, numerous parties).159  Our
analysis here not only shows that civil lawyers only have in mind quasi-
multital relations (as a propertized contract generally binds indefinite,
nonnumerous parties), ignoring the possibilities of compound-
paucital relations, but also implies that quasi-multital relations can fur-
ther be categorized.  The civil-law lease is one type of quasi-multital
relation.  Covenants for co-owned personal property are another case
in point.  The Taiwan Civil Code stipulates that co-owners of personal
property can also covenant to arrange usage.  Nevertheless, because a
registry for most types of personal property does not exist in Taiwan,
the law stipulates that only bad-faith transferees of the shares are
bound by the covenants.  Here, whether the covenant runs with assets
depends on whether a third party knows enough about what she buys!
Since the covenant does not always run, but bad-faith third parties are
still bound by the covenant, the covenant constitutes another type of
quasi-multital/quasi-property relation (different from the lease
type).160
C. Transaction Cost Explanations
Why have civil law countries adopted and stuck to the three fea-
tures of its style of delineation—the unitary concept of property
rights, strict separation between property and obligation, and the defi-
nition of property rights as relations between persons and things?  As
we have demonstrated above, these concepts cannot adequately
explain lesser property rights like mortgages or pledges and inhibit
civil laws from adequately characterizing intermediate relations
between contract and property that are prevalent nowadays.  We pre-
sent an explanation based on path-dependence, even though the path
is very long, and sometimes winding.
As is well known, current civil law systems, especially in their law
of property,161 are still deeply influenced by the Roman law that was
stipulated about two millennia ago and was self-consciously revived at
various later times.162  In both France and Germany, Roman law
159 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 29, at 786. R
160 The Taiwan Supreme Court, in another context, has ruled that a contract
could bind bad-faith parties and those who should have (but do not have) knowledge
about the contract. This relation is yet another type of quasi-multital/quasi-property
relation.
161 See Sjef van Erp, A Comparative Analysis of Mortgage Law: Searching for Principles,
in LAND LAW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 69, 71 (Marı́a Elena Sánchez Jordán &
Antonio Gambaro eds., 2002).
162 We do not argue that civil law countries have adopted the whole package of
Roman property law.  For discussions of how industrialization in Germany in the nine-
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served as a background focal point.163  Roman concepts have per-
sisted in many ways on the European Continent for two thousand
years.  The Roman jurists thought that property (in rem) referred to
“a relationship between a person and a thing,”164 and they regarded
only corporeal things (res corporales) as the object of property rights.165
As a result, they “felt no need to make a clear distinction between
ownership and its object.”166  Nevertheless, in many respects, Roman
property law is strikingly different from modern civil property law:
Roman law adopts an extremely rigid unitary concept of property
rights.  Indeed, under classical Roman law, a property owner was “not
allowed to transfer anything less than the entire bundle of rights, priv-
ileges, and powers that he had in the property,”167 with very few
exceptions.168  In addition, “there is no Roman definition of owner-
ship . . . . [T]he commentators adapted the definition of usufruct by
adding to the rights of use and enjoyment” the right of disposal.169
Furthermore, security interests such as pledge (pignus) and mortgage
(hypotheca) are discussed under the heading of obligation,170 not
property.171  The idea of “possession” is used restrictively, applied only
to owners, because “[t]he Roman probably understood by ‘possession’
not simply the holding of a thing but rather the holding of a thing in
the manner of an owner;”172 that is, a usufructuary is not in possession
of the land he uses.173
The three features first developed by the Romans and inherited
by the civil law countries actually make sense—for the Romans.  Since
full ownership is the predominant form of property rights, a unitary
teenth century moved the German nuisance law away from Roman law influence, see
Claus Ott & Hans-Bernd Schäfer, The Dichotomy Between Property Rules and Liability
Rules: Experiences From German Law, 1 ERASMUS L. REV. 41, 46–50 (2008).
163 So much so that Savigny could defend a version of Roman law as a sort of
German people’s law against contemporaneous efforts at codification. See FRIEDRICH
CARL VON SAVIGNY, VOM BERUF UNSERER ZEIT FÜR GESETZGEBUNG UND RECHTSWISSEN-
SCHAFT (Heidelberg: Muhr und Zimmer 1814).
164 BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 100 (1962).
165 Id. at 106–07.
166 Id. at 107.
167 Francesco Parisi, Entropy in Property, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 595, 603 (2002).
168 Id. at 603–04.
169 NICHOLAS, supra note 164, at 154. R
170 Note that in countries like Portugal, mortgage and pledge are still stipulated in
obligation.  The French Civil Code stipulates mortgage and pledge separately from
contracts and property.
171 One modern commentator has considered it “both of contract and of prop-
erty.” NICHOLAS, supra note 164, at 150. R
172 Id. at 111.
173 Id. at 110–11.
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concept is probably the clearest, if not the only, way to capture the
idea of full ownership as the major form of property right.  In addi-
tion, without some forms of security rights that do not entitle their
interest holders to possess or literally use the thing, conceiving prop-
erty rights as relations between persons and things174 is perhaps con-
ceptually easier to understand than the property concept we advance
in this Article.  Given the Roman’s narrow concept of property rights,
intermediate relations are largely inconceivable, thus justifying a strict
separation between property and obligation.175
With the fall of the Roman Empire came the feudal property sys-
tem and various local customary laws.  But Roman law and its property
concept were not dead.  Roman law continued to be studied by jurists
in various places, including in what is now France and Germany, and
was sometimes even drawn on to adjudicate cases.176  Indeed, medie-
val jurists struggled to reconcile feudalism with the Roman law con-
cept of unitary ownership.177  Still, how was Roman law formally
internalized into those modern civil codes?  In the case of France,
when the Revolution overthrew the old political regime and the
accompanying feudal property system,178 the commission established
by Napoleon to submit a draft of a new civil code based its ideas of
ownership and property law mainly on Roman law.179  Why revive
Roman law?  As Francisco Parisi indicated, “[d]uring the 18th century,
it had become fashionable to point to the feudal tradition as the root
of inefficient property fragmentation and to rebel against the feudal
heritage by proclaiming a new paradigm of absolute and unified prop-
erty.”180  The “new” paradigm is actually quite old and was the under-
current of the property regime through the medieval and pre-
174 For such conception of property in Roman law, see, for example, Aynès, supra
note 82, at 147. R
175 For the Roman conception of strict separation, see AKKERMANS, supra note 68, R
at 172–74 (referencing the writings and observations of Friedrich Karl von Savigny).
176 See, e.g., id. at 84 (“[I]t became a custom of French lawyers to invoke the Corpus
Iuris Civilis.  In this respect, Roman law was customary law in the south of France.”
(footnote omitted)).
177 Joshua Getzler, Plural Ownership, Funds, and the Aggregation of Wills, 10 THEORET-
ICAL INQUIRIES L. 241, 251 (2009).
178 See Parisi, supra note 167, at 602; AKKERMANS, supra note 68, at 85; Ugo Mattei, R
Property Rights in Civil Law, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE
LAW 157, 158–59 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
179 See AKKERMANS, supra note 68, at 86.  Indeed, the subject matter of Napoleonic R
Code was nearly identical with that of the first three books (persons, things, and
actions) of the Institutes of Justinian. See MERRYMAN & PEREZ-PERDOMO, supra note
118, at 10; STEINER, supra note 69, at 379. R
180 Parisi, supra note 167, at 602. R
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Revolutionary era, especially in southern France.181  As for the codifi-
cation itself, the codifiers, and Portalis in particular, attempted to
enshrine a version of natural law derived from Pothier in the eight-
eenth century and Domat, Grotius, and Pufendorf in the seventeenth,
who in turn drew on the Spanish jurists of the sixteenth century.182
Because these notions were set forth very abstractly—in terms of
delineating property on the basis of things—it was easy for the code to
receive a more individualistic interpretation in the nineteenth cen-
tury.183  What is striking is how the Roman vocabulary and style, based
on things and dominion, could remain a thin but constant element
through very different legal regimes over a long period of time.  Thus,
modeling a new civil code after the Roman one saved information
costs for French jurists184 and obviated the institutional costs of switch-
ing to a new set of property doctrines that are not necessarily better
than Roman law.
In the case of Germany, the Roman law was formally “received”185
as binding law long before Germany was unified in 1871.186  There-
fore, it should come as no surprise that many German scholars in the
nineteenth century considered a unitary concept of ownership as “the
only possible type of ownership.”187  The Roman idea of strict separa-
tion between property and obligation was also whole-heartedly
accepted by German jurists (Trennungsprinzip in German) and is even
considered the foundation of German property law.188  Thus, simi-
larly, codifying the Roman law principle reduced information costs
and institution costs.189
With French property law and German property law as its mod-
ern incarnation, the Roman property law concept took flight—even to
181 See, e.g., VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 121, at 2, 6, 17. R
182 James Gordley, Myths of the French Civil Code, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 459, 461–62
(1994).
183 Id. at 466–68.
184 Inheriting Roman law may even reduce information costs for ordinary people
who may have been governed by Roman law as customary law, as was the case in
southern France.
185 Germany, the Netherlands, and many other European countries “received”
Roman law. See, e.g., Kleijn et al., supra note 86, at 109; VAN CAENEGEM, supra note R
121, at 2–3. R
186 MERRYMAN & PEREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 118, at 10. R
187 AKKERMANS, supra note 68, at 174. R
188 See id. at 173.
189 For the influence of Roman Law on Germany’s BGB, see, for example, VAN
CAENEGEM, supra note 121, at 156–57; JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE LEGACY OF ROMAN LAW R
IN THE GERMAN ROMANTIC ERA, at x–xi (1990).
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Asia.  First Japan, then Taiwan190 and other countries, and finally
China modeled its property law after Germany’s BGB and basically
maintained the three features identified above—the unitary concept
of property, the strict separation of property and obligation, and the
definition of property as a relation between a person and a thing.
Given the high switching costs and the fact that civil property law
works just fine most of the time, it is not surprising that civil law coun-
tries stick to their “styles” of delineating legal interests.  Nevertheless,
it is hard to understand, other than preserving the traditional way of
thinking, why modern jurists in civil law countries do not manage to
change their concept of property rights.  Changing the conceptual
framework requires no political costs, for the three features discussed
above are mainly scholarly constructions, and thus not a word in the
civil code needs to be changed.  Roman jurists developed the concep-
tual framework of property without taking into account mortgage,
pledge, superficies (the right to construct and use a major fixture like
a building on others’ land), and emphyteusis (like a permanent lease-
hold).191  That framework, as argued above, is ill-suited for the mod-
ern world.  Perhaps, the costs of paradigm-shifting in academia are
also too great, and, other than legal scholars, who support the old
paradigm, no one else is seriously affected by those three features;
thus, there is again no constituency for reform.
Putting the pieces together, our transaction cost theory accounts
for the broad structural similarities and the subtler stylistic differences
between common and civil law property.
The functional outlines of the two property systems are very simi-
lar, probably for familiar reasons of purpose and possibly evolutionary
pressures to serve those purposes.192  In particular, overwhelming
190 Taiwan’s civil code was actually enacted in 1930 when the Republican govern-
ment reigned in China.  This code was supposed to apply in China, and indeed did so
for about two decades.  Apparently, China has no Roman law tradition.  But this civil
code and all of the previous drafts (the first one announced in 1910, the last year of
the Qing Dynasty) were influenced by German Civil Code and Japan Civil Code.  Why
didn’t China emulate the common law?  Archival work suggests that civil law was pre-
ferred by the Qing Dynasty because civil law is more centralized and thus conformed
to the tastes of the ruling “Mandarins.” See Feng Deng, Why Did China Choose the Civil
Law? An Economic Analysis, 2 PEKING U. L.J. 165 (2009) (in Chinese).
191 Barry Nicholas observes that superficies and emphyteusis “were admitted to the
private law too late for any theoretical account . . . .  The lawyers of the late Empire
were content to leave them simply as institutions sui generis.” NICHOLAS, supra note
164, at 157. R
192 Even as big a proponent of the use of an idealized Roman law to attain theoret-
ical purity as von Savigny conceded that “merely theoretic considerations must give
way to the actual wants of daily life . . . .” FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, VON SAVIGNY’S
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transaction cost advantages favor the basic exclusion-governance
architecture.  Sometimes these basic features common to many prop-
erty systems are conveniently labeled and classified using the terminol-
ogy or categories of Roman law.193
Within these broad outlines, systems vary in their method or
“style” of delineating property rights, as we have been discussing.  For
exogenous political reasons—feudalism and gradualism in the com-
mon law, and Roman origins and anti-feudal Roman-based reform in
the civil law—large fixed costs were incurred at specific times in the
past.194  The ability to incur these costs to effect change only happens
rarely, and, when it does, it does not occur as part of judicial lawmak-
ing.  Especially in property, legislatures have taken the primary role in
major changes in the property system, particularly ones that have in
rem effects, even in common law countries.195  This is consistent with
legislatures and sovereigns (e.g., William the Conqueror) rather than
courts being the major innovators—they are the only ones that can
effectively incur the large fixed costs.  Post-Conquest, high switching
costs and network effects have caused lock-in.
Moreover, the Roman-inspired style of property delineation
served as a coordination device over long stretches of time in the civil-
TREATISE ON POSSESSION; OR THE JUS POSSESSIONIS OF THE CIVIL LAW 404 (Erskine
Perry trans., 6th ed. 2002) (1848).  For one famous version of the functional view, see
Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV., no. 2, May 1967
at 347.  On evolution, see, for example, Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and
Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 211 (1950) (drawing a parallel between the biologist
and the economist in assessing decision-making while accounting for uncertainty in
the environment). See also Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common
Law: A Supply-Side Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1551 (2003) (examining the changes in
the efficiency of common law legal rules using supply-side, institutional conditions
relating to competition).
193 On the influence of Roman law in the common law treatise tradition, includ-
ing famously Blackstone, see Alan Watson, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 97
YALE L.J. 795 (1988).  On the ius commune in England, see R. H. HELMHOLZ, THE IUS
COMMUNE IN ENGLAND: FOUR STUDIES (2001).  For the ius commune in Continental
Europe, see RENÉ DAVID & JOHN E. C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD
TODAY 45–46 (3d ed. 1985).
194 See, e.g., PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 119 (1999) (“The Ger-
man Romanists were not interested in tracing the way in which Roman law had been
adapted to serve the needs of contemporary society . . . .  [T]hey wanted to reveal the
inherent theoretical structure that was implicit in the [Roman] texts.”); R. C. VAN
CAENEGEM, JUDGES, LEGISLATORS AND PROFESSORS: CHAPTERS IN EUROPEAN LEGAL HIS-
TORY 82, 113–26 (1987); Richard A. Posner, Savigny, Holmes, and the Law and Economics
of Possession, 86 VA. L. REV. 535, 536–40 (2000); James Q. Whitman, The Moral Menace
of Roman Law and the Making of Commerce: Some Dutch Evidence, 105 YALE L.J. 1841, 1843
(1996).
195 Merrill & Smith, supra note 14, at 58–68. R
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ian world.  Legal communication about property is served by conver-
gence on a single style, and Roman law was focal for the reasons
discussed earlier.  Similarly, in the common law world, the estates and
future interests provided a familiar (to lawyers) language of delinea-
tion with network effects, long after the demise of feudalism itself.
These conditions created styles of delineation that exhibited path
dependence.  Style is very real from an internalist perspective, and
captures the (somewhat exaggerated) differences between systems as
perceived by their respective practitioners.  More easily measurable is
a subset of style features: the number of property forms.  Common law
systems typically have a larger set of property rights and are somewhat
more open-ended—they have a less strict numerus clausus.196
With respect to the style of delineation, the two systems only
allowed tinkering around the edges.  In part, this is a consequence of
the numerus clausus, and in part it is the result of the institutional inca-
pacity of courts to make major changes.  In the case of the estate sys-
tem, it has been very difficult to generate interest in reforming the
system and reducing the number and complexity of legal estates.
Rarely does anyone find it worthwhile to incur the large fixed costs of
changing the style of delineation.  Where it has happened, as in
England in 1925, it has occurred as part of broader land law reform
legislation.  In civil law countries the status quo is reinforced by the
norm built into the system that the Code is the exclusive source of
legal obligation.197
What is the significance of these developments?  We believe that
the style of delineation, based on dominion in the civil law and on
estates in the common law, is worthy of explanation in the first place.
The more exaggerated instances of legal styles are also, we argue,
symptoms, in each case, of a lack of attention to the difference
between use interests and the lumpy legal interests to which they cor-
196 Id. at 8–11, 20–24; Chang, supra note 83. R
197 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 749 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey eds., 1994) (1958) (observing that civil law codes are based on “a self-con-
tained body of statutory provisions which are to be taken as the exclusive source of
law, and to which all judicial decisions must be referred”); JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN,
THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN
EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 22–23 (2d ed. 1985) (observing that separation of powers
as formulated in civil law countries precludes the doctrine of stare decisis and judge-
made law, and that in civil law tradition “only statutes enacted by the legislative power
could be law,” as supplemented by administrative regulations and custom); ALAN WAT-
SON, THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL LAW 168 (1981) (observing that statutes, including
foremost the code, along with governmental and ministerial decrees, are the only
independent source of law, with a possible subordinate source of law in custom).
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respond.  Importantly, style of delineation is part of a mode of com-
munication with network effects that contributes to the overall “legal
culture.”  And in certain areas, the style of delineation may have a
substantive impact, as with the treatment of leases, mortgages, and the
like in civil law, and German law in particular.  To this we might add
the needless complexity of the common law estate system, where it
persists, and the attractiveness of the trust that allows the legal estates
not to be of much practical use.
CONCLUSION
Both the common and civil law must distinguish interests in use
from the often indirect legal structure—legal interests and the devices
that protect them—in order to avoid the massive transaction costs of a
“complete” property system.  To borrow a term from corporate law,198
this is the (or at least an) “essential role” of property law.  And the two
systems respond to a variety of real world problems with similar broad
structures.  Nevertheless, the path dependence of the delineation pro-
cess in the two systems—feudalism and (revived) Roman law, respec-
tively—make the starting point and the details of delineation—what
we are calling its style—quite different.  The lack of constituency for
change and the generativity and flexibility of the systems reduce the
pressure to change at this level, reinforcing the path dependence.
The result is the characteristic anomalies at the doctrinal and the-
oretical level in the two traditions.  The idea of property as relations
between persons regarding resources springs naturally from the feu-
dal property system, but the idea is not just useful in feudalism or the
common law estate system.  We have demonstrated that property as
structured relations better explains the well-recognized lesser prop-
erty interests, especially security interests, and the ever more prevalent
propertized contracts in civil law systems.  On the other hand, the
estate system as abetted by Legal Realism deemphasizes things to the
point of obscuring the role delineation costs play in the shape of
property law.  Further, the common law has overlooked the fact that
not all property relations are the same.  There are four prototypical
property relations.  Obscuring this typology has caused confusion in
the literature on the essence of a property right.  We argue that in
rem status, the right to exclude, and running with assets all count as a
sine qua non of a property right.  In other words, a property right is not
a bundle of rights, but a right with these three features that relates to
the use of some defined thing.
198 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law,
110 YALE L.J. 387, 393–94 (2000).
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Legal styles of delineation have a remarkable persistence.  Some
form of path dependence lies at the root of this persistence.  Legal
delineation is a matter in part of communication, which is subject to
network effects from the need to coordinate.  Other generators of
path dependence, such as large fixed costs, learning effects, and adap-
tive expectations, likely also play a role.  Also, to the extent that style is
compatible with functional change to meet new needs, switching styles
will generally not be cost-effective. Moreover, because of the special
needs of in rem coordination and communication, we predict that the
style of property delineation will be more resistant to change than is
true of contract law, and that within property law the most in rem
aspects will likewise be the most stable stylistically over time.  So-called
mixed systems and the peripheral mixed aspects of conventionally
denominated common law and civil law systems are consistent with
these predictions.
Harmonization of contract law and tort law has been under way
on the continental (Europe, most prominently) and even the global
level.199  Property law, by contrast, is often lacking in comparative law
scholarship, owing to the ostensible gulf between common and civil
law property law.200  By proposing a transaction cost theory that
explains where the differences between civil and common law proper-
ties come from and their significance, and by advancing a more
sophisticated concept of property that can better depict both the com-
mon and civil law property rights, we hope to provide a platform for
global comparative property law.
199 See, e.g., van Erp, supra note 135, at 234–35. R
200 In an important book, TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE, there are thirteen
chapters (about 200 pages) on contract law and five chapters (about 100 pages) on
tort law, but just four chapters (about seventy pages) on property law. See EWOUD
HONDIUS ET. AL., TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE (Arthur Hartkamp et al. eds., 4th
ed. 2011).  In another book, ENGLISH, FRENCH, & GERMAN COMPARATIVE LAW, there
are chapters on constitutional law, contract law, tort law, etc., but no chapter on prop-
erty law! See RAYMOND YOUNGS, ENGLISH, FRENCH, & GERMAN COMPARATIVE LAW (2d
ed. 2007).  Note, however, that the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment has proposed a model law on non-possessory security over movable properties.
This model law “[is] compatible with civil law concepts and, at the same time, [draws]
on common law systems.”  John Simpson & Joachim Menze, Ten Years of Secured Trans-
actions Reform, EBRD’S OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL SECURED TRANSACTIONS PROJECT
21 (2000), available at http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/legal/secured/lit002b.pdf.
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